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1.1 Introduction 
This  essay develops an  integrated  model  of  exchange  rate  behavior  that 
synthesizes many  recent and older contributions  to the theory  of exchange 
rate determination.  Since the task of exchange rate theory  is to explain be- 
havior  observed  in  the  real  world,  the  essay  begins  (in  sec.  1.2) with  a 
summary of empirical regularities that have been characteristic of  the behav- 
ior of exchange rates and other related  variables during periods of  floating 
exchange rates. This discussion continues (in sec. 1.3) with the presentation 
of a schematic model of the exchange rate as an “asset price”  that depends 
on  a  discounted  sum  of  economic  factors  that  are  expected  to  affect  the 
foreign exchange market in present and future periods. This schematic asset 
price model  implies  a convenient  decomposition  of  exchange rate changes 
into their  expected  and  unexpected  components;  and  it suggests  a general 
explanation  for the  dominance  of  the  random,  unexpected  component  of 
exchange rate change in  actual exchange rate movements. 
Specific content for the schematic asset price model of  the exchange rate 
is provided  (in sec.  1.4) by  considering  a reduced-form  expression for the 
condition  of  money  market  equilibrium  in  which  both  the  level  and  the 
expected  rate  of  change of  the  exchange  rate  affect  the  demand  to hold 
domestic  money.  Under  the  assumption  of  rational  expectations,  this  re- 
duced-form equilibrium condition implies that (the logarithm of) the nominal 
exchange  rate is an exponentially  weighted  average of  expected future dif- 
ferences  between  (the  logarithms  of)  the  nominal  money  supply  and  the 
exogenous component  of  money demand. This result,  which  allows a key 
role  for expectations  concerning  future  money  supply and money  demand 
behavior in determining the current exchange rate, is contrasted with simple 
monetary  models that  focus on current  money  supplies and current money 
demands as the determinants of exchange rates. 
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An alternative  asset  price  model  of  the  exchange  rate  emerges  (in  sec. 
1.5) from a  reduced-form  expression  of  the  condition  of  balance  of  pay- 
ments equilibrium  that is derived  from an extended version  of the  standard 
two-country model of international trade. This model, which focuses on the 
real exchange rate and other real variables,  embodies the essential ideas of 
the  elasticities  and  absorption  approaches  to  the  balance  of  payments  and 
the  traditional  partial  equilibrium  model  of  the  foreign  exchange  market. 
Under the assumption  of rational expectations,  the model  yields an expres- 
sion for the current real exchange rate as a discounted sum of the expected 
future  values of  the  exogenous real  factors that  affect excess demands for 
foreign  and domestic  goods and the desired relationship  between  spending 
and  income.  From  this  result  conclusions  may  be  derived  concerning  the 
relationships among the real exchange rate, the current account balance,  and 
the net stock of foreign assets. 
Combination of the reduced-form models of monetary and balance of pay- 
ments equilibrium yields (in sec. 1.6) an equilibrium model of the determi- 
nation of the exchange rate. This model illustrates the coordinate importance 
of  monetary  factors  affecting  the  supply  and  demand  for money  and  real 
factors affecting excess demands for specific goods and of the desired rela- 
tionship  between  spending  and  income  in  influencing  the  behavior  of  the 
exchange rate. Modification  of this equilibrium model by the introduction of 
an appropriately  specified  adjustment rule for the domestic  money price of 
domestic  goods  (in  sec.  1.7) results  in  a disequilibrium  model  of  the  ex- 
change rate  in  which monetary  disturbances  have  real  effects on  levels of 
output, relative prices, and the real exchange rate. The model illustrates the 
phenomenon  of exchange rate “overshooting”  in response to monetary  dis- 
turbances  and  the  role  of  such  disturbances  in  inducing  temporary  diver- 
gences from purchasing power parity. The essay concludes with a brief sum- 
mary and a discussion of possible extensions. 
1.2 Empirical Regularities and Their Theoretical Implications 
A central objective  of theoretical  models of exchange rate determination 
ought to be a clearer understanding of the economic mechanisms governing 
the actual behavior of exchange rates in  the real  world  and of the relation- 
ships  between  exchange  rates  and  other  important  economic  variables.  In 
surveying theoretical models of exchange rate determination,  therefore,  it is 
appropriate to examine the empirical regularities that have been characteris- 
tic of the behavior of exchange rates and other related variables under float- 
ing exchange rate  regimes.  It  is  also relevant  to discuss  the  minimum  re- 
quirements  for any theoretical  model  of  exchange  rate  determination to be 
consistent with these empirical regularities. ’ 
1.  Empirical  regularities  in  the  behavior  of  exchange  rates and  their  implications  for ex- 
change rate theory are discussed  in Mussa (1979); see also Dooley and  Isard (1978), Frenkel 
and Mussa (1980), lsard (1980), and Frenkel (1981). 15  The Theory of Exchange Rate Determination 
1.2.  I  The Stochastic Behavior of Exchange Rates and Related  Variables 
Experience with floating exchange rates between the United  States dollar 
and other major currencies (the British pound, the German mark, the French 
franc, the Swiss franc, and the Japanese yen) during the  1970s has revealed 
five  general  characteristics  of  the  behavior  of  exchange  rates  and  related 
variables under a flexible exchange rate regime in which  the  authorities do 
not intervene too actively in the foreign exchange markets. These character- 
istics also apply, in general, to the experience  with floating exchange rates 
between  major  currencies during 1920s and  1930s and, with  some modifi- 
cations,  to the  experience  of  floating  exchange  rates  between  the  United 
States and Canadian  dollars  during the  1970s. They do not  always  apply, 
however, to situations in which exchange rates have been very actively man- 
aged, such as the exchange rate between  the Mexican  peso and the  United 
States dollar or the exchange rates between  currencies within the European 
Monetary System. 
First,  statistical examination  of  the behavior  of  (logarithms  of)  spot ex- 
change rates reveals that they follow approximately random walks with little 
or no drift.  The standard  deviation  of  monthly  changes  in  exchange  rates 
between major currencies and the United States dollar (except the Canadian 
dollar) has been about 3% per month, with changes of more than 5% occur- 
ring  with  moderate  frequency.  (In comparison,  changes  in  national  price 
levels, measured by consumer price indices,  have had  a standard deviation 
of  about 1% per month, and monthly changes have virtually never exceeded 
5% in  major  industrial  countries  during  the  1970s.) Moreover,  there  has 
been virtually no predictable pattern in monthly exchange rate changes, and, 
at most, only a small fraction of such changes has been  anticipated by  the 
market,  as measured by the forward discount or premium.  These facts may 
be  summarized  in  a general  characteristic:  Monthly  changes  in  exchange 
rates  are frequently  quite  large and  are almost entirely random  and  unpre- 
dictable. 
Second, analysis of the correlation between contemporaneous movements 
in spot and forward exchange rates (for maturities extending out to  1 year) 
indicates that spot and forward rates tend to move in the same direction and 
by  approximately  the  same  amount,  especially  when  changes  are  fairly 
large. Some evidence suggests that forward rates are marginally  affected by 
risk premia and hence do not correspond exactly to the market’s expectation 
of the spot exchange rate at the maturity date of the forward contract.* This 
evidence, however,  is not sufficiently strong to overturn the assumption that 
forward rates  are reasonable  though  approximate  estimates of the  market’s 
expectation  of corresponding  future spot exchange  rates.  This assumption, 
together  with  the  observed  contemporaneous  correlation  of  movements  in 
spot and forward rates,  implies a second general characteristic of exchange 
rate  behavior:  Changes in  spot exchange  rates  which  are largely  unantici- 
2. See, in particular, Hansen  and  Hodrick (1980). 16  Michael Mussa 
pated  correspond fairly closely to  changes in  the market’s expectation of 
future spot exchange rates. 
Third,  contrary to the doctrine of  purchasing power parity  (PPP), there 
has not been a close correspondence between movements in exchange rates 
and movements in the ratio of  national price levels, especially during the 
1970~.~  Monthly  (or quarterly) changes  in exchange rates  have  averaged 
about three times as great as monthly (or quarterly) changes in the ratio of 
consumer price indices, and the correlation between exchange rate changes 
and  changes  in the  ratio of  national price  levels has  been  close to  zero. 
Moreover,  while  there  has  usually  been  positive  serial  correlation  of 
monthly changes in the ratio of consumer price indices, there has been  no 
corresponding  serial correlation of  monthly  exchange rate  changes.  Over 
longer time periods,  such as a year,  cumulative divergences from relative 
purchasing power  parity  between  the  major  industrial countries have  fre- 
quently been  as  large  as  10%. Using  the  concept of  the  “real  exchange 
rate”  (defined as the price of  a unit of  foreign money in  terms of domestic 
money, divided by the ratio of  the home consumer price index to the foreign 
consumer price  index),  these  facts  may  be  summarized in the  following 
characteristic: Monthly changes in nominal exchange rates are closely cor- 
related  with  monthly  changes  in  real  exchange  rates,  and  cumulative 
changes in real exchange rates over a period of a year have been quite large. 
Fourth,  during  the  recent  period  of  floating exchange rates,  there may 
have  been  a  weak  general  tendency for countries that  experienced sharp 
deteriorations in their current accounts subsequently to experience deprecia- 
tion  in  the  nominal  and  real  foreign exchange  value  of  their  currencies. 
There also may have been a weak general tendency for countries that expe- 
rienced sharp appreciations in nominal and real foreign exchange values of 
their currencies subsequently to experience deterioration in their current ac- 
counts. It has not been the case, however, that exchange rates have adjusted 
rapidly to eliminate current account imbalances, nor has there been  strong 
correlation between exchange rate changes and either levels of  changes in 
current account balances that has held up consistently over time and across 
countrie~.~  These facts may  be  summarized in  the following characteristic: 
There is no strong and systematic relationship between movements in nom- 
inal or real exchange rates and current account balances that allows for an 
explanation of  a substantial fraction of actual exchange rate movements. 
Fifth,  countries that  experience very  rapid  expansion  of  their domestic 
3.  See, for example, Kravis and Lipsey (1978) and Frenkel (1981a). 
4.  Some evidence has been presented that movements in current account balances are among 
the factors influencing movements  in  exchange rates; see Branson (1976), Branson, Haltunen, 
and Masson (1977).  Dooley and Isard (1978), Dornbusch (1978,  1980a), Isard (1980), Artus 
(1981), and Driskill  (1981). It  has not  been the case, however,  that exchange  rates have ad- 
justed  rapidly  to eliminate current  account  imbalances or that a large fraction of  monthly or 
quarterly  movements  in  exchange  rates  is  easily explained  by  movements  in current account 
balances. 17  The Theory of  Exchange Rate Determination 
money  supplies  also experience  rapid depreciation of the foreign  exchange 
value  of  their  money, relative  to  the  monies  of  countries  with  much  less 
rapid  monetary  e~pansion.~  For countries  with  only  modest  differences  in 
their rates of  monetary  expansion  (such as has been  true for the major  in- 
dustrial countries during the 1970s), however,  there is only a tenuous, long- 
run relationship  between high relative rates of monetary expansion and de- 
preciation  in the foreign exchange value of domestic money.  In  particular, 
there  is  little or no  statistical  correlation between  monthly  changes  in  ex- 
change rates and monthly differences in rates of monetary expansion for the 
major  industrial  countries  during the  1970~.~  These facts may  be  summa- 
rized  in  the  following  characteristic:  Movements  in  nominal  and  real  ex- 
change rates are not closely related  to differential rates of  monetary  expan- 
sion, except possibly for some very highly inflationary economies. 
1.2.2 Implications for Theories of  Exchange Rate Behavior 
One of the implications of these general facts is that no simple model of 
exchange rate determination provides an adequate explanation of  most of the 
observed  movement  in  nominal  and  real  exchange  rates  under  a  floating 
exchange rate regime.  The bulk  of observed  movements  in exchange rates 
cannot  be  explained  by  a naive  “payments flows”  model,  which  suggests 
that exchange rates adjust either  immediately or gradually to maintain  bal- 
ance of  payments  equilibrium.  A  naive  monetary  model  that  relates  ex- 
change rate movements to differential rates of monetary expansion (with or 
without some form of lagged adjustment) does not perform appreciably bet- 
ter in explaining the bulk of exchange rate movements,  except possibly for 
highly inflationary economies. A naive PPP explanation (not really a theory) 
of exchange rate movements also performs rather poorly. 
A second important implication of  the observed characteristics of the be- 
havior of exchange rates and related  variables concerns the general concep- 
tion of exchange rates as “asset  prices.”  Exchange rates share many of the 
general  behavioral characteristics  of the prices of  assets that  are traded on 
organized exchanges, such as common stocks, long-term bonds, and various 
metals and agricultural commodities. Monthly changes in the prices of these 
assets,  like monthly changes in exchange rates (but unlike monthly changes 
in consumer price indices) are largely random and unpredictable.  For assets 
with  quoted  spot  and  future  prices,  there  tends  to be  a  strong correlation 
between  changes  in  spot  prices  and  contemporaneous  changes  in  futures 
prices,  indicating  that changes  in spot prices  are largely  unanticipated  and 
correspond  fairly  closely  to changes  in  the  market’s  expectation  of  future 
spot  prices.  Monthly  changes in  the  prices  of  assets  traded  in  organized 
5. See, in  particular, Frenkel (1976). 
6. For  an  assessment of the  failures of  simple  monetary models  to  explain exchange rate 
movements  in  the  1970s,  see  Dornbusch  (1978,  1980a), Frankel  (1979,  1982), Meese  and 
Singleton (1980), and  Meese and Rogoff (1982). 18  Michael Mussa 
markets are not closely correlated with monthly changes in the general price 
level, as measured by the consumer price index, implying that most nominal 
price changes are also real price changes. 
These common characteristics in the behavior of prices of  assets traded in 
organized markets suggest that there should be important common elements 
in the theory of  the behavior of  such prices. In particular, for any asset that 
may be held in inventory at a relatively small storage cost and bought and 
sold with  a relatively small  transaction cost,  we  ought to expect that  the 
price today would be reasonably closely linked to the price that is expected 
at some day in the near future, such as a month hence. The reason for this 
linkage is that  if  there were a substantial expected rise  in the price of  the 
asset over the course of  a month, individuals would have a strong incentive 
to acquire and hold the asset, putting upward pressure on its current price 
and  downward pressure  on  its  expected future price,  until  the  difference 
between these two prices was brought within the limits implied by  storage 
and transactions costs. 
This same argument implies that there should be a reasonably close link- 
age between the price of an easily storable and tradable asset that is expected 
1 month from now and the price of that same asset that is expected 2 months 
from now, between the price of  the asset expected 2 months from now and 
the  price expected  3 months  from  now,  and  so on  into  the  more  distant 
future. Through this mechanism, the current price of an easily storable and 
tradable asset is linked to the economic conditions that are expected to affect 
the ultimate demand and supply of that asset in all future periods. Expected 
changes in the prices of  such assets should reflect expected changes in the 
economic conditions that affect the ultimate demand and supply of the asset. 
In contrast,  unexpected changes in  the prices of  such assets should reflect 
new  information that changes expectations concerning the economic condi- 
tions that affect the ultimate demand for and supply of  the asset. The obser- 
vation that changes in many asset prices are largely random and unpredict- 
able reflects the empirical preponderance of  unexpected price changes due 
to new  information over expected price changes in determining the actual 
behavior of  most asset prices.’ 
1.3 The Asset Market View of Exchange Rate Determination 
The  gross  similarities between  the  behavior of  exchange rates  and  the 
behavior of  the prices of  other assets traded  in  highly  organized markets 
suggests a common general approach to analyzing the behavior of such asset 
prices.  The essential elements of this  general approach, as  applied to ex- 
change rates, may  be represented in a simple theoretical model that relates 
7.  It  is  not  theoretically  necessary  that the unexpected component of  price change should 
dominate  actual movements  in asset prices.  Nevertheless,  this appears to be  true in  all orga- 
nized asset markets. 19  The Theory of  Exchange Rate Determination 
the current exchange rate to present and future conditions that are expected 
to affect the foreign exchange market.8 This simple model assumes that the 
logarithm of the exchange rate at time t, e(t);  is determined by 
where E{[e(t + 1) -  e(t)];  t}  denotes the expected percentage rate of change 
of  the exchange rate between t and t  + 1, conditional on information avail- 
able at t, and where X(t) represents the basic conditions of  supply and de- 
mand that affect the foreign exchange market at time t. The essential idea 
of equation (1) is that the exchange rate that yields equilibrium in the foreign 
exchange market at time t is affected not only by the basic factors of  supply 
and demand summarized by  X(t), but also by  the expected rate of  change of 
the exchange rate which motivates domestic and foreign residents to move 
assets either into or out of foreign exchange depending on whether the price 
of  foreign exchange is expected to rise or fall. 
To close the model, it is necessary to specify how expectations of  future 
exchange  rates  are  determined.  It  is  assumed  that  these expectations are 
“rational”  in the sense that they are consistent with the validity of equation 
(1) in  all future periods. By  forward iteration of  (1) and application of  the 
appropriate boundary  condition,  we  arrive at  the  conclusion that  the  ex- 
change rate expected at any t  + j,  forj ? 0, depends on a weighted average 
of  expected future X’s, starting at  t  + j and extending farther into the fu- 
ture?  specifically, 
* E(X(t + j  + i);  t). 
Setting j  = 0, we obtain the expression for the current exchange rate as a 
weighted average of  present and expected future X’s. 
Using  equation (2),  we  may  obtain a convenient decomposition of  the 
actual change in  the  exchange rate,  D[e(t)] =  e(t +  1) - e(t),  into its 
expected change component, D“[e(t)]  = E{D[e(t)];  t} = E[e(t + 1); t] - 
e(t), and its unexpected change component, D”[e(t)J  = e(t +  1) - E[e(t 
+  1); t]. Specifically, applying the expected change operator De( ) to (2) 
withj = 0, we may conclude that 
CD 
~‘[e(t)l  = [1/(1 + a)] -  C [a/(l + a>]’ 
- E{D[Xff + 31;  4). 
(3)  i=O 
8. It is widely recognized that expectations are critically important in determining the behav- 
ior  of exchange rates;  see, for  example, Dornbusch  (1976,  1980b). Frenkel  (1976),  Kouri 
(1976a), Mussa (1976, 1982a), Ethier (1979), Rogoff (1979), and Wilson (1979). The present 
exposition of the asset price model is based on that given in Frenkel and Mussa (1980). 
9. A  boundary  condition  is  imposed  on the  forward-looking solution  of  (1)  to  ensure  an 
economically sensible, nonexplosive solution. 20  Michael Mussa 
Thus, the expected change in the exchange rate is a weighted  average of  all 
expected  future changes  in  the X's. This result may  also be  written  in the 
alternative form, 
(4) 
which expresses the expected change in the exchange rate as proportional to 
the difference between the weighted  average of all expected future X's that 
determines E[e(t +  1); t] and the current X(t), with a ihtor of proportion- 
ality of [ I/(  1  + a)].  The unexpected change in the exchange rate is deter- 
mined by applying the unexpected change operator D"(  ) to (2)  with J  = 0; 
D'[e(t)] = [l/(l + a)]  *  {E[e(t +  1);  t] - x(t)}, 
(5)  -  {E[X(t + j  +  1);  f  +  I] 
-  E[X(r + j  +  1); t]}. 
Thus, the unexpected  component  of  the  change  in  the  exchange rate  is  a 
weighted  average of the change in expectations about future X's, based on 
new information that is received between t and t  +  1. 
From  these  results,  it  is possible  to argue that  expected  changes  in  ex- 
change rates are unlikely to be very large. Specifically, consider the monthly 
expected  change in  the  exchange rate  between  two  countries  with  similar 
and  modest  inflation  rates  and  nominal  interest  rates.  It  is  reasonable  to 
suppose that  the parameter,  a, that  measures  the  sensitivity  of  the  current 
exchange rate to the expected rate of change of  the exchange rate is on  the 
order of ten or twenty."  It follows that the factor 1/(1 + a)  that appears on 
the right-hand side of (4) will be on the order of one-tenth or one-twentieth. 
This implies that it  takes  a difference of  10% or 20%  between  the current 
expected value of X(t)  and the weighted average of future expected X's sum- 
marized  by E[e(t +  1); t] to justify  a  1% expected change in the exchange 
rate between t and t  +  1. 
No similar argument can be advanced for why the unexpected component 
of the change in the exchange rate should usually be small. This component 
of the change in the exchange rate is necessarily  random and unpredictable 
because it depends on the effect of new information received between t and 
+  1 on expectations  of  all future X's. A  small unexpected  change  in X, 
for instance, might convey information that leads to a substantial revision of 
expectations of all future X's and hence to a substantial unexpected change 
in the exchange rate. 
These results  also explain  why  spot and  forward exchange  rates tend  to 
move  together,  especially  for when  changes  are  fairly  large.  If  expected 
exchange  rate  changes are usually  small, then  any large change  in  an ex- 
10.  A  justification  for  this  assumption  is given  in  connection  with  the  discussion  of  the 
monetary  model  of  exchange  rate  determination  in  the  next  section;  see  specifically  n.  18 
below. 21  The Theory of Exchange Rate Determination 
change rate is likely to be primarily attributable to a large unexpected com- 
ponent of the change in the exchange rate. Since the unexpected component 
of  the  change  in  the  exchange  rate  depends  on  a  weighted  average  of 
changes in expectations about all future X’s, large unexpected changes in an 
exchange rate  should generally be  associated with  substantial changes,  in 
the same direction, in expectations about each of these future X’s. From (2), 
it is apparent that substantial changes in  the same direction in expectations 
about each future X  should induce substantial movements in the same direc- 
tion of  both the current spot exchange rate and expectations of  future spot 
exchange rates. 
From this discussion, it  should be  apparent that the simple asset market 
model represented by  equations (1) and (2)  is capable at least of rationaliz- 
ing some of the important empirical regularities that characterize the behav- 
ior of  floating exchange rates. The critical result that allows for this ration- 
alization is the pricing formula (2) which expresses the exchange rate as a 
discounted sum of  the basic  factors that  are expected to affect the foreign 
exchange market  in  the present and  in future periods. This formula is ob- 
viously similar to the standard formula for expected present discounted value 
that is relevant in determining the current value of an income-yielding asset. 
Any  model of  exchange rate determination that ultimately yields a pricing 
rule similar to (2), with a discount rate that is not too large, will possess the 
essential  properties  illustrated  by  the  present  simple  model.  Differences 
among  such  models  reflect  differences in  the  specification of  the  “basic 
factors affecting the foreign exchange market”  or in the determinants of the 
sensitivity of the current exchange rate to the expected rate of change of the 
exchange rate.  In this general conception of  the exchange rate as an asset 
price, however, nothing has been said about the fundamental importance of 
asset market equilibrium conditions, as opposed to flow market equilibrium 
conditions,  in determining the exchange rate.  As subsequent analysis will 
show, it  is  perfectly possible to  arrive at  an  asset price  model  of  the ex- 
change rate by  focusing on the condition for equilibrium in balance of  pay- 
ments  flows as the fundamental equilibrium condition that  determines the 
exchange rate.” 
1.4  Monetary Models of Exchange Rate Determination 
Since an exchange rate is the relative price of one nation’s money in terms 
of  the money of  another nation, it is natural to think of an exchange rate as 
11.  Many of the earlier papers that described the asset market approach to exchange rates, 
including  some of  my own papers, wrongly placed their emphasis on the conditions of  asset 
market equilibrium as the critical determinants of  exchange rates. It is clear to me that one can 
arrive  at an  asset  price  expression  for the exchange rate  from a model that focuses on flow 
market equilibrium conditions. More generally, one must recognize that in any sensible model 
of exchange rates both asset market and flow market equilibrium conditions are important, and 
it is a matter of expository convenience which of them one chooses to emphasize. 22  Michael Mussa 
determined, at least proximately,  by the outstanding stocks of these monies 
and  by  the  demands to hold  these  stocks. This  simple  proposition  is  the 
starting-off point for two related but distinct classes of monetary models of 
exchange rate determination.  The first class of  monetary models, which have 
been  widely  applied  in  empirical  studies  of  exchange rate  behavior,  ex- 
presses the current exchange rate as a function of the current stocks of  do- 
mestic and foreign money and the current determinants  of the demands for 
these monies, including domestic and foreign income and interest rates. The 
second class of monetary models, which has been more widely  used in the- 
oretical  work, focuses on the influence  on the current exchange rate of  the 
expected  future path  of money supplies and of factors affecting money de- 
mands.  The distinguishing  features of  these two classes of models requires 
that they should be given separate attention. 
The essential content of the first class of  monetary  models may  be sum- 
marized  in an equation of the form 
(6) 
where e is the logarithm of the price of foreign money in terms of domestic 
money, m is the logarithm of the domestic money supply, I is the logarithm 
of demand for domestic  money (a function of domestic  income, y, the do- 
mestic  interest  rate,  i, and  other factors  k), and  an  asterisk  (*) indicates 
variables  for the  foreign  country."  In  some presentations,  equation  (6) is 
derived from the following assumption;:  (1)  The logarithm of the domestic 
price  level,  P,  is determined by domestic  money market equilibrium to be 
P = m - l(y, i, k). (2) The logarithm  of  the  foreign  price  level,  P*,  is 
determined by the foreign money market equilibrium condition to be P* = 
m*  - 1*  (y*,  i*,  k*). (3) The equilibrium  exchange  rate  is determined  by 
the requirement of purchasing power parity to be e  = P -  P*  = m - m* 
-  (Ily, i, k] - I*Ly*, i*,  k*]). 
Monetary models of exchange rate determination have been criticized  be- 
cause of the  inadequacy  of the assumptions used to perive equation (6). In 
particular,  the assumption of purchasing power parity has been criticized as 
not consistent  with  the  facts, especially  the  facts of  the  197Os.l3 The col- 
lapse of purchasing power parity in the  1970s, however, is not (in my judg- 
ment)  adequate  reason  for rejecting  equation  (6) as a model  (albeit  an  in- 
complete model)  of  exchange rate  determination. l4  This  equation  can  be 
derived without explicit reference to purchasing power parity; indeed,  it can 
e=m-m*- (Ib,  i, k] - /*b*,  i*,  k*]), 
12.  Models  of  this  type  are examined  in  Bilson  (1978,  1979),  Hodrick  (1978).  Frenkel 
(1980), and Frenkel and Clements (1982). 
13.  For example, this is one of Dornbusch's (1980a) main criticisms of  the monetary model 
of  exchange rate determination. 
14.  In my own work on exchange rates,  I have almost never assumed that purchasing power 
parity always holds, and have not regarded this assumption as essential to analyzing the role of 
monetary variables in influencing exchange rates; see Mussa (1976, 1977, 1979, 1981a, 1982~) 
and Frenkel and Mussa (1980). 23  The Theory of  Exchange Rate Determination 
be derived from a model that allows explicity for divergences from purchas- 
ing power parity. Moreover, some empirical studies employing equation (6) 
have noted that there are divergences from purchasing power parity and have 
argued that the conditions of  money market equilibrium are more immedi- 
ately relevant for determining the exchange rate (which is a freely adjusting 
asset price) than  they  are for determining national price  level^.'^  This, of 
course, leaves open the important question of  what determines the behavior 
of  national price levels, which in turn is an important element in explaining 
the  behavior of  real  exchange rates.  Nevertheless,  if  equation (6) worked 
well  in  explaining  the  behavior  of  nominal  exchange rates,  this  form  of 
monetary model of exchange rate determination would clearly make a sub- 
stantial contribution to our understanding of the economic forces influencing 
the behavior of  exchange rates. 
The principal empirical difficulty with this form of monetary model is that 
equation (6) does not work well in explaining actual movements in nominal 
exchange rates,  unless we  take into account shifts in the demands to hold 
different national monies that are difficult to explain in terms of  traditional 
arguments appearing in money demand functions.  l6 An  example illustrates 
this difficulty  as well  as a set of  regressions.  Between  October  1976 and 
October 1980, the British pound appreciated by  50% in terms of the United 
States dollar, from $1.60 to $2.40. During this same period, monetary ag- 
gregates in Britain grew more rapidly than corresponding monetary aggre- 
gates in the United States,  while real income (a key  variable affecting the 
demand for money) grew less rapidly  in Britain than in  the United States. 
Of  course, the increase in dollar value of sterling might be explained by  an 
increase  in the demand to  hold  sterling combined with  a decrease in  the 
demand to hold  dollars,  resulting from increased confidence in  the  future 
value of  sterling (due to North  Sea oil and the policies of  Prime Minister 
Thatcher) and from increased concern about the  inflationary consequences 
of the policies of  the Carter administration. However, it is difficult to take 
these effects into account in a rigorous and disciplined fashion in an empir- 
ical version of equation (6). 
Another important deficiency of equation (6) as a model of exchange rate 
determination is that it does not explicitly reveal the critical role of  expec- 
tations of  future economic conditions in determining the current exchange 
rate.  From  equation  (6),  there  is  no  immediately  apparent  reason  why 
changes in  exchange rates should be largely random  and unpredictable, or 
why new information that alters expectations about future economic condi- 
tions (including supplies and  demands for national monies) should induce 
such random and unpredictable changes in exchange rates. 
15.  Bilson (1979) advances this argument in  his paper concerning the dollar-mark exchange 
16.  The relatively poor empirical performance of  monetary models in explaining exchange 
rate. 
rate movements in  the  1970s is documented in Meese and Rogoff  (1982). 24  Michael Mussa 
The second  general class of monetary  models of exchange rate determi- 
nation  does not  suffer  from this  deficiency.  These models  usually  treat  a 
small or moderate size economy that takes conditions in the rest of the world 
as given.I7 The critical  condition  determining  the  exchange rate  for  this 
country is the requirement of money market equilibrium; 
(7) 
where rn  is the logarithm of the domestic money supply, e is the logarithm 
of the price of foreign money in terms of domestic money, k summarizes all 
exogenous  factors  affecting  the  logarithm  of  the  demand  for  domestic 
money, and D‘(e) = E(e(t +  1);  t) - e(t)  is the expected  rate of change 
of the exchange rate.  As will be made clear by the analysis in section  1.6, 
equation  (7) should be thought  of as a reduced-form  equilibrium condition 
derived from a more basic model of goods and asset market equilibrium.  In 
this reduced  form, the parameter  5 captures all of  the mechanisms through 
which an  increase  in the price of  foreign money  increases the demand  for 
domestic  money,  and  the  parameter  q captures  all  of  the  mechanisms 
through  which  an  increase  in  the  expected  rate of  change of  the  price  of 
foreign money affects the demand for domestic money. 
Since the reduced-form  demand  for domestic  money depends on the ex- 
pected rate of change of the exchange rate,  it follows that the current equi- 
librium  exchange rate  depends not only on the  current values of  m and k, 
but also on the expectation of next period’s exchange rate; 
rn  = k  + 5  *  e -  q  - D‘(e),  5,  q > 0, 
(8)  40 =  + 7l)l  “t)  -  k(0l  + [M  + q)l 
.  E(e(r +  1);  t). 
Forward iteration of (8), justified by the assumption of rational expectations, 
leads to the conclusion that the exchange rate expected at any future date is 
an  exponentially  weighted  sum  of  expected  future  differences  between  m 
and k; 
(9) 
*  E(w(s + j);  0, 
where  w(u) =  (115)  -  [rn(u) - k(u)].  The current  exchange  rate, e(t) = 
E(e(t);  t),  is found by setting s = f in (9). This result reveals the fundamen- 
tal principle that the current exchange rate depends on the entire future ex- 
pected path of differences between (the logarithms of) the money supply and 
the exogenous component of money demand. 
Using the general procedure  outlined  in section 2.3, (9) may be used to 
decompose the change in the exchange rate into its expected and unexpected 
17.  Monetary models of  the type examined here are considered in  Mussa (1976, 1982~)  and 
Bmo (1978). 25  The Theory of Exchange Rate Determination 
components. The expected change in the exchange rate is given by 
(10) 
If, as is plausible to suppose, 5/(5 + q)  is on the order of one-tenth or one- 
twentieth, then large monthly expected changes in the exchange rate should 
be unlikely.18  In  contrast, the unexpected  change in  the  exchange rate  is 
given by 
D'[e(t)l = (5/(5 + q)) -  +  1); t) - E(w(t);  t)l. 
z 
D"l4t)l = (U(5 + q)) - c  (.1/(5 + ?)IJ 
J=o 
(1 1)  *  [E(w(r + j  +  I); t  +  1) 
- E(w(t + j  +  1);  t)]. 
If the new  information  received between  t  and t  +  1  leads to a substantial 
revision  of  expectations concerning all  future  w's (in  the same direction), 
this random and unpredictable component of  the change in the exchange rate 
could be quite large. 
To proceed  with the analysis of  changes in  the exchange rate, it  is nec- 
essary to specify how  expectations about m and k are formed  and revised. 
One convenient theoretical assumption is that k is a known constant, k,  that 
the money supply is observed each period before the exchange rate is deter- 
mined,  and  that  the  stochastic  process  generating  the  money  supply  is 
known  to economic agents and used  by  them  (together  with  data  on the 
present  and past money  supplies) to project the future course of  the money 
supply. To be specific,  suppose that m is generated by a random walk plus 
noise but that economic agents observe only m and not its permanent  (ran- 
dom walk) and transitory  (noise) components. In this case, economic agents 
will form an estimate k(t),  of  the current level of the permanent component 
of  m  by  taking  a weighted  average of  present  and past m's, and they  will 
attribute the difference, m(t) -  rfi(t), to the present transitory component of 
m. The expected level of m in any future period will equal k(t).  The current 
exchange rate,  e(t) = (1/5)  -  [rfi(t) - kl  +  + q)]  -  [m(t) - k(t)l, 
fully reflects the component of the money  supply that is thought to be per- 
manent, but is less strongly affected by the component of  the money supply 
that is thought to be transitory. The expected  change in the exchange rate, 
D'[e(t)] =  -[1/(5  + q)]  *  [m(t) - k(t)],  reflects the expected disappear- 
ance of  the transitory  component of  m. The information  received  by  eco- 
nomic agents between t  and t  +  1 is measured  by difference between  the 
actual level of m(t +  1) and the level that was expected at time t, E(m(t + 
1); t) = k(t).  A fraction, a,  of this difference is attributed to an increase in 
18. In  order to  have an  interest elasticity of  money demand (given by  i  *  q)  equal to  0.1, 
when the nominal interest rate is  1% per month, we must have q = 10. If  5 = I,  as it would 
under strict purchasing power parity and no currency substitution, then L/(c + 7)  would equal 
1/11, If  the interest elasticity of  money demand were  as large  as 0.2 and  5 were  as small as 
0.5, then [/([  + q) would be as small as  1/41. 26  Michael Mussa 
the permanent component of m, and the remaining fraction,  1 -  cx, is attrib- 
uted  to the  transitory  component in  m(t +  l), where the fraction  cx is  an 
increasing function  of  the ratio of  the  variance of  disturbances  to the per- 
manent  component of  m to the  variance  of  transitory  disturbances  to m.I9 
The unexpected  change in  the exchange rate, D"[e(t)]  = {(a/<)  +  [(I - 
ci)/(c +  q)]}  *  [m(t +  1)  - rfz(t)], reflects,  as it  should,  the  information 
received by economic agents between t and t  +  1. Consistent with common 
sense, this unexpected  change in the exchange rate is greater the greater is 
the deviation of the money supply from its expected level and the greater is 
the fraction of this deviation that is attributed to a change in the permanent 
component of the money supply. 
This example illustrates  the  key  point  that  the  nature  of  the  stochastic 
process governing the behavior of  the exchange rate depends on the process 
generating  the behavior  of the  money supply and on the information about 
this process that is available to economic agents.  In particular,  this example 
illustrates that the response  of  the exchange rate to a change in the money 
supply depends on the extent to which this change was unanticipated  and on 
the  extent  to which  any unanticipated  change  is thought  to indicate  a per- 
manent change in the money supply.2o 
Aside  from its theoretical  usefulness,  however,  the assumption that  eco- 
nomic agents use their knowledge  of the (fixed) stochastic process generat- 
ing the money supply as the primary ingredient in forming the expectations 
necessary for determining  the exchange rate is not likely to provide a fully 
adequate  empirical  explanation  of  actual  exchange  rate  movements.  One 
likely reason for this inadequacy is that economic agents use many sources 
of information, other than the observed money supply series and other easily 
measured  variables,  in  forming  and  revising  their expectations  concerning 
future money supply behavior. For example, the depreciation of  the French 
franc on the day  following  the election  of  President Mitterand clearly was 
not  due to any  observed  policy  change (registered  in  the  behavior  of  the 
money supply or other variables) since President Mitterand did not assume 
office until 3 weeks later. It must have been due to a change in expectations 
about future policy resulting from the fact of his election. 
Another  important  barrier  to monetary  explanations  of  actual  exchange 
rate movements arises from the lack of adequate measures of the exogenous 
factors affecting the demand for money and of  expectations concerning the 
future behavior of these factors. Almost certainly,  there have been shifts in 
the  demands to  hold  national  monies  that  are  not  accounted  for  either by 
changes in the traditional arguments  appearing in money demand functions 
19.  See Muth (1960) for a description and derivation of this result. 
20.  For stochastic processes that allow for changes in the long-run growth rate of  the money 
supply, as  well  as its long-run  level, it  is  possible  for  unanticipated  changes  in  the  money 
supply to generate even stronger responses of  the exchange rate. This possibility is examined 
in  Mussa (1976). 27  The Theory of Exchange Rate Determination 
(such  as  levels  of  national  income)  or  by  changes  in  expectations  about 
future exchange rate  movements  induced by  changes in expectations  about 
money supply behavior.  In theory, such demand shifts should play a role of 
coordinate  importance with changes in money supplies (and changes in ex- 
pectations  about  future  money)  supplies  in  determining  movements  in  ex- 
change rates.  The inadequacy of measures of  money demand shifts means, 
therefore,  that a substantial fraction of  actual exchange rate movements will 
not be adequately explained by monetary models. 
One possible way around this difficulty is to adopt the view that changes 
in  exchange rates  which  cannot  be explained  by  changes  in  the  actual  or 
expected  behavior of money supplies must be due to changes in the actual 
or expected behavior of money demands.  The tautological view of the mon- 
etary model of exchange rate determination can be justified on the grounds 
that the money market equilibrium condition represented by equation (7) is 
a  reduced  form  that  incorporates  all  of  the  conditions  of  goods  and  asset 
market equilibrium.  However, this tautological view of the monetary model 
still  does not  provide  an  explanation  of  many  exchange rate  movements, 
other than  ascribing them  to  “shifts  in money  demands”  arising from un- 
known  sources.  Moreover, while it is possible to view  all economic forces 
affecting the exchange rate as operating through  money demand  or money 
supply, this may lead to a rather convoluted and unnatural view of the mech- 
anisms  through  which  some economic  forces  affect the  exchange  rate.  In 
such circumstances,  it is not  sensible to insist on  an exclusively  monetary 
interpretation of the determination of exchange rates. 
1.5  Balance of Payments Equilibrium and the Exchange Rate 
The traditional approach to analyzing exchange rate behavior focuses on 
the condition of  balance of payments equilibrium as the proximate determi- 
nant  of  the  equilibrium  exchange rate.  A  common  feature of  models  that 
adopt this approach is the assumption that an increase in the price of foreign 
exchange implies an increase in the relative price of a country’s imports in 
terms of its exports and (provided certain elasticity conditions are satisfied) 
an increase  in the net  inflow of  foreign exchange arising from current  ac- 
count transactions.’’  The (momentary) equilibrium exchange rate in such a 
model  is  the  exchange rate  at  which  the  net  inflow  of  foreign  exchange 
arising from current account transactions is balanced  by the net outflow re- 
sulting from capital  account  transactions.  In this  section I consider  a for- 
mulation of this traditional  approach to the theory of  exchange rate  deter- 
21.  This assumption is made in the standard flow model of the foreign exchange market that 
is described in virtually every textbook on international economics. The elasticity condition that 
is required to ensure stability of the foreign exchange market is sometimes the Marshall-Lerner 
condition and sometimes the more complicated Robinson-Metzler-Bickerdike  condition. 28  Michael Mussa 
mination that results in  an “asset  price”  model of  the exchange rate which 
shares the general features of the schematic model examined in section 1.3. 
1.5.1 Goods Market Equilibrium and the Trade Balance 
To  avoid  the complexities of  dealing with  nominal  prices and  nominal 
exchange rates,  it  is convenient to phrase the present model of  balance of 
payments  equilibrium  in  terms  of  real  variables.  The  model  considers  a 
moderate-size home country that trades two goods (domestic goods and for- 
eign goods) and a single real asset (denominated in foreign goods) with the 
rest of the world (referred to as the foreign country). Real assets pay a fixed 
rate of return, r*, in terms of foreign goods; and the net stock of such assets 
held by  domestic residents, A, may  be positive or negative.22 Foreign resi- 
dents are willing to exchange large flow amounts of  foreign goods in  ex- 
change for foreign (real) assets at  the prevailing rate of  return r*, but they 
are not willing to purchase large amounts of  domestic goods (of the home 
country) in exchange for foreign goods at a fixed relative price of these two 
goods. Instead, the value of  foreign demand for domestic goods (measured 
in units of foreign goods) is given by 
where q is the logarithm of the relative price of  domestic goods in terms of 
foreign goods, x*  is a shift parameter that takes account of  all exogenous 
factors (including government commercial and expenditure policies) that af- 
fect foreign demand for domestic goods,  and  p* > 0 reflects the relative 
price elasticity, equal to - [ 1  + (p*/d*)],  of foreign demand for domestic 
goods. 
The desired trading position of the home country with respect to goods is 
described by  that country’s excess demand for foreign goods, f, and by  the 




where  $ is  the  excess  of  domestic  spending over  the  value  of  domestic 
product (measured in terms of  foreign goods), u  and  1 - u  are the (mar- 
ginal) shares of  domestic and foreign goods in domestic spending, x  is a 
shift parameter  that  accounts for exogenous factors (including tariffs  and 
government spending policies) that  affect the  distribution of  home  excess 
demand between foreign and domestic goods, and p > 0 reflects the relative 
f=  (1 - a).* + p-q  -  x, 
d = a**  - p*q  + x, 
22.  A  nontradable  domestic  asset  may  be  added  to the  model  without  altering  its  basic 
character or  its analytical complexity. The equilibrium condition that the demand for this asset 
must equal the available supply can be used to determine the equilibrium rate of return on this 
asset and eliminate this variable from the model. 29 
price elasticity,  equal to  -(P/f),  of  home demand for imports of  foreign 
The system of  excess demand functions (12), (13), and (14) can be inter- 
preted as a modified and extended version of the standard two-country, two- 
commodity model of the real theory of international trade.24  In this interpre- 
tation,  equation (12) represents the offer curve of the foreign country and 
equations (13) and (14) represent the offer curve of the home country. The 
home offer curve is displaced from the origin of  commodity trade by  the 
excess of  the domestic spending over the value of domestic product. There 
is  no  corresponding displacement  of  the  foreign offer  curve because,  by 
assumption,  the  large foreign country absorbs the home  country’s excess 
spending through a flow of securities, without any effect on foreign demand 
for domestic goods of  the  home  country.  This interpretation of  equations 
(12),  (13), and (14) can also be applied in the special case of the standard 
two-country,  two-commodity model  that  is widely  used  in discussions of 
macroeconomic issues in which it is assumed that each country produces a 
distinct output.  To arrive at this form of model,  all that  is necessary is to 
assume, without any formal change in the equations, that the home country 
produces no foreign goods. Along a somewhat different line, equations (12), 
(13), and  (14) can be  interpreted as representing the standard model of  a 
“dependent economy”  which produces and consumes its own domestic non- 
traded good and also produces,  consumes, and either exports or imports a 
traded good that  is identical to traded goods sold on the world market. To 
arrive at this interpretation, all that is necessary is to regard the foreign good 
as the traded good  (recognizing that domestic excess demand for this good 
could be positive or negative), to view d as domestic excess demand for the 
nontraded good  (which must  be  zero  in equilibrium),  and  to  specify that 
foreign excess demand for this nontraded good, d*, must be zero. 
Consistent with all of these interpretations of the excess demand functions 
(12), (13), and (14), it is appropriate to express the requirement for equilib- 
rium in the market for domestic goods (of the home country) by the require- 
ment 
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d + d*  = 0. 
There is no similar condition for equilibrium in the market for foreign goods 
because,  by  assumption,  the  foreign country absorbs the  home  country’s 
excess for these goods in  exchange for a flow of  securities. Thus, equation 
(15) represents the condition for goods market equilibrium. 
23. It  is noteworthy that  the  total  value of home excess demand for  foreign and domestic 
goods, f + d,  is equal, as it should be, to the excess of domestic spending over the value of 
domestic  product. Thus,  given the  value  of  $,  there  is  really  only  one  independent  excess 
demand function specified by (13) and (14). 
24. This  is the  model  that  is  described,  for  instance,  in  Mundell  (1960) and  in  most ad- 
vanced texts in international economics. 30  Michael Mussa 
From this goods market equilibrium condition and from the specification 
of  the determinants of  d and  d*  given in  (12) and (14), we  may  derive a 
critical relationship between the excess of domestic spending over the value 
of  domestic  product,  $,  the  (logarithm of  the) relative price  of  domestic 
goods in terms of  foreign goods,  q, and the shift parameters affecting do- 
mestic and foreign demand for domestic goods, x and x*; 
v *  (2 - 4,  (16)  -$ = 
where 
v = (p + @*)/a 
and 
(  17b) 
The significance of  this relationship becomes apparent when we  recognize 
that  the trade balance of  the home  country (measured in  units  of  foreign 
goods),  T, must equal the excess of  the value of  foreign purchases of  do- 
mestic goods, d*, over domestic purchases of foreign goods,f; that is, T = 
d*  -  f. Using this fact together with (12), (13), and (16), we  arrive at the 
conclusion that 
z  = (x  + x*)/(P  + p*) 
(18)  T =  -$ = V.(Z -  4). 
This result expresses the fundamental equivalence between the “absorption” 
and the “elasticities”  approaches to analyzing the behavior of  the trade bal- 
an~e.’~  The absorption approach views that trade balance as the excess of 
the value of  domestic output over domestic spending; that is, as  -$.  The 
elasticities approach views the trade balance as a function, v *  (z - 4), of 
the relative price of domestic goods in terms of  imported goods and of  the 
other (exogenous) factors affecting demands for imports in the two coun- 
tries. From the perspective of the elasticities approach, it is noteworthy that 
the  assumption that  the parameters p and  p* are positive is  sufficient to 
insure that  the Marshall-Lemer condition is satisfied and hence that  an  in- 
crease in the relative price of domestic goods worsens the trade balance. 
1 S.2 The Meaning and Implications of Balance of Payments Equilibrium 
Ignoring unilateral transfers, and assuming that services such as transport, 
insurance,  and  tourism have been  incorporated into the trade balance,  the 
current account balance of  the home country must equal its trade balance 
plus  the interest income that  home  residents receive (or pay) on their net 
foreign asset holdings; that is, 
(19)  b  = T + r*.A = v.(z - 4) + r**A. 
25. On the subjects of  the elasticities and absorption approaches to the balance of payments, 
see Alexander (1959) and Johnson (1958). 31  The Theory of Exchange Rate Determination 
In  the  absence of  official  intervention,  the  current  account  balance  must 
correspond to the rate of  accumulation of  net  foreign assets by  home resi- 
dents, 
(20)  D(A) = b = v *  (Z - 4)  + r*  *A, 
where D  is the forward difference operator. 
As a matter of economic behavior, the rate of accumulation of net foreign 
assets must also correspond to the desired excess of  domestic income (in- 
cluding net  interest income) over domestic spending. The behavioral deter- 
minants of  the desired excess of  income over spending are indicated by  the 
relationship 
(21)  r* .  A - $ = (Y  *  (R - p)  +  )J.  *  (A -  A),  (Y,  p > 0, 
where r*  *  A - $ represents the accounting value of the excess of  income 
over spending, R  is the domestic real interest rate,  p is the natural level of 
the real  interest rate at which  domestic residents would want to spend ex- 
actly  their  income  (provided that  net  foreign  assets  were  at  their  target 
level),  and A is the target level  of  net  foreign assets that  home residents 
would like to hold  if R  were equal to p. Since only the sum,  (Y  -  p  +  )J.  - 
a, matters in  (21), and not either p or A independently, it can be assumed, 
without loss of generality, that  p  = r*, and all exogenous changes in the 
desired  excess  of  income  over  spending  can  be  treated  as  arising  from 
changes in the target level of net foreign assets. 
The domestic real interest rate that influences the desired relationship be- 
tween income and spending, R, depends on the foreign real interest rate, r*, 
and  the  expected rate  of  change of  the relative price of  domestic goods, 
DW: 
(22)  R=r*- u .  D74). 
The  idea  underlying  (22) is  that  spending behavior of  home  residents is 
affected by  the rate of return they expect to earn on their assets measured in 
terms  of  a consumption basket  that  includes domestic and  foreign goods 
with  weights  of  u and  1 - IT.  If  the relative price of  domestic goods in 
terms of  foreign goods is expected to rise at a rate D'(q), the expected real 
rate of return on  assets that have a fixed price in terms of foreign goods and 
pay a fixed rate of  return of  r*  in terms of  such goods is less than r*  by an 
amount u  - De(q). 
The desired rate of  asset accumulation implied by  the desired excess of 
domestic income over domestic spending, as determined by  (21) and (22), 
must in equilibrium, be consistent with the net  inflow of  foreign assets re- 
sulting from the current account balance, as determined by (19) or (20). This 
consistency requirement is expressed by  the condition 
(23)  v*(z  -  q) + r*.A =  -au.D'(q)  + p*(A  -A). 32  Michael Mussa 
This condition  may  be interpreted  as the  requirement  for balance  of  pay- 
ments equilibrium.  It  says that  current  account  surplus,  which  is the  sum 
of the trade balance  surplus,  u  *  (z - q),  and the service account surplus, 
r*  -  A, must  be  equal  to the  capital  account  deficit,  -au 
(a -  A), which  is determined by desired asset accumulation by home resi- 
dents. 
A superior, but not necessarily  conflicting, interpretation of (23) is that it 
represents two distinct sets of economic conditions that must simultaneously 
be satisfied  in order for the economic system to be in (momentary) equilib- 
rium.  The left-hand  side of (23) summarizes the implications of the excess 
demand functions (12), (1  3), and (14) and the requirement of  goods market 
equilibrium  (15). The left-hand side of (23) has real  interpretation as a net 
flow of  goods and  services,  and it has  a financial  interpetation as a corre- 
sponding  flow offinancial claims. The right-hand  side of (23) summarizes 
the content of the behavioral  equations and equilibrium conditions that un- 
derlie the determination  of the desired excess of domestic income over do- 
mestic spending. It too has a real interpretation, as an excess of real income 
over real  spending; and it has a financial interpretation,  as a corresponding 
rate of  accumulation of financial claims. Equation  (23) simply requires that 
the real flows of goods and services and the corresponding flows of financial 
claims  determined  by  the  relationships  that  underlie  the  two  sides  of  this 
equation be mutually consistent. 
The determination  of  the  momentary  equilibrium  ‘‘real exchange  rate,” 
which is identified with q, by the balance of payments equilibrium condition 
(23)  is  illustrated  in  figure  1.1.  The  negatively  sloped  line  labeled  I,  * 
(z - q) + r*  - A  shows the net flow demand for foreign exchange arising 
from  current  account  transactions.  The  positively  sloped  line  labeled 
au[q -  E(q(t +  1); t)] + ,(a  -  A) shows the net flow supply of foreign 
exchange arising  from desired  asset  accumulation  by  domestic residents.26 
The intersection of  these two lines determines the current q that is consistent 
with  balance  of  payments  equilibrium,  given  the  values  of  z,  A, a, and 
E(q(t +  1);  t). In  many  discussions,  the positively  sloped line in  figure  1 
(or its  equivalent)  is  interpreted  as representing  the  behavior  of  ‘‘foreign 
exchange speculators”  who  are distinguished  from  ordinary  transactors  in 
the  foreign  exchange market  (whose behavior  is  represented  by  the  nega- 
tively  sloped  line  in  fig.  1.1 or  its  equivalent).  As  the  preceding  analysis 
makes clear, however, this distinction between “speculators”  and “ordinary 
transactors”  is  artificial  and  unnecessary.  The two  sides of  equation  (23) 
and the corresponding lines in figure  I.  1 represent different behavioral equa- 
tions and equilibrium conditions,  but for the same set of economic agents. 
D‘(q)  + p 
26.  The model of  exchange rate determination that is represented in  figure 2.1 is consistent 
with the rather naive descriptions of the foreign exchange market that appear in many textbooks 
and with  more sophisticated “flow  market”  models  of  the exchange rate developed by Tsiang 
(1959). Stein (1965), Stein and Tower (1967), Black  (1973), and Niehans (1977). 33  The Theory of  Exchange Rate Determination 
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Fig. 1.1  Balance  of  payments  equilibrium  and  the  equilibrium real  ex- 
change rate. 
Under  the assumption of rational  expectations, the  difference equations 
(20) and (23) may be treated as a simultaneous, forward-looking  system that 
jointly determines the expected  future paths of A  and q, conditional  on the 
inherited  level of  net foreign  assets, A(t), and the expected  future paths of 
the exogenous forcing variables z and a. The solution of this system for the 
current value of  q may be written in the form2’ 
m 
27.  As  in the case of the monetaly model of  the previous section, a boundary condition is 
imposed that ensures an  economically sensible, nonexplosive solution for the difference equa- 
tion system (20) and (23). 34  Michael Mussa 
(28)  A  = (1/2) *  {[r* + (u/acr)] 
+ .\/[r*  + (v/acr)]*  + 4 - (p/acr)}. 
These results may be interpreted in the following manner: q(t) represents 
the  “long-run  equilibrium exchange rate”  that is expected to be consistent 
with the current account balance (b = 0) on average in the present and  in 
future periods,  with  an  appropriate rate  of  discount,  A,  for future current 
account imbalances,  and  assuming that  net  foreign  assets are currently at 
their long-run desired level. The long-run desired level of net foreign assets, 
x(t), is a discounted sum of  the expected target levels of  net foreign assets 
in  the  present  and  in  future periods.  The discount rate  that  is  applied to 
expected future A’s in determining x(t)  and to expected future z’s in deter- 
mining q(t)  depends,  in an economically appropriate manner, on the sensi- 
tivity of  the trade balance of  changes in q and on the sensitivity of  capital 
flows to changes in the domestic real interest rate and to changes in the net 
stock of  foreign assets held by  domestic residents. Finally, the current real 
exchange rate, q(t),  reflects both the current estimate of  the long-run equi- 
librium exchange rate, q(t),  and the current divergence of A(t) from its long- 
run desired level, x(t). 
1.5.3 The Real Exchange Rate as an Asset Price 
The balance of  payments equilibrium condition (23) that  is the essential 
ingredient in deriving the results  (24)-(28)  is,  on  its  face,  a flow  market 
equilibrium  condition  rather  than  an  asset  market  equilibrium condition. 
Nevertheless, this equilibrium condition implies a solution for q(r)-which 
is  identified with  (the  logarithm of)  the  real  exchange rate-that  may  be 
thought of in two distinct ways as the expression for an asset price. 
First,  given q(t)  and A(t),  it  is apparent from (24) that  the  current real 
exchange rate, q(t),  is related to the stock of  net  foreign assets, A(t), in the 
manner that is suggested by  a number of  recent  “asset  market models”  of 
the role of  the current account  in exchange rate dynamics.28 The essential 
idea of these models is that the momentary equilibrium real  exchange rate 
is determined by  the price at which domestic residents are willing to hold 
their existing net position in foreign assets. The greater is the net  stock of 
foreign  assets,  A, the  lower is the price at  which  domestic residents will 
hold this stock; that is, the higher is the momentary equilibrium value of  q 
(which is defined as the logarithm of the relative price of domestic goods in 
terms  of  foreign goods).  Given  the exogenous factors affecting trade  bal- 
ance, the higher is 4 the smaller is the trade balance surplus (or the greater 
is the trade balance deficit) and hence the slower is the rate of  accumulation 
of foreign assets by domestic residents. These relationships imply a dynamic 
28.  Models of  this type include those developed by  Branson (1976). Kouri (1976a), Calvo 
and Rodriguez (1977), Dornbusch and Fischer (1978), and Rodriguez (1980). 35  The Theory of Exchange Rate Determination 
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Fig. 1.2  Dynamic interaction among the exchange rate, asset stocks, and 
the current account. 
process, which  is illustrated  in figure  1.2, in which an initial divergence of 
net foreign assets from their long-run equilibrium level, A,  implies a diver- 
gence of  the momentary equilibrium level  of  q from the level  that  would 
yield a zero current account balance, and a subsequent sequence of current 
account imbalances and  corresponding changes  in  net  foreign assets that 
ultimately drive net foreign assets to their long-run equilibrium and q to the 
level that yields a zero current account balance. This is exactly the dynamic 
process that is implied by the results (24)-(28)  when the exogenous forcing 
variables  z  and a are constant. 
Second, the value of  q(t)  determined  by (24)-(28)  is an “asset price”  in 
the  sense  discussed  in  Section  1.3 because the  long-run  equilibrium ex- 
change rate, ij(t), and the long-run  desired  level of  net foreign assets, A(t), 
which influence q(t)  are, respectively, forward-looking  weighted averages of 
the present and expected future exogenous factors affecting the trade balance 
(the Z’S)  and  the present  and expected future target  levels  of  net  foreign 
assets (the a’s).  The critical assumption that confers this “asset price” prop- 
erty on q(t) is the assumption  that the expected  rate of  change of q, D‘(q), 
affects the desired excess of income over spending and hence the condition 
for balance of  payments equilibrium. As previously  explained, one justifi- 
cation  for this  assumption is  in  terms of  the effect of  D‘(q)  on the real 
interest  rate  that  is relevant  for domestic spending and  saving decisions. 
Another, essentially equivalent justification is in terms of the effect of antic- 
ipated  capital gains on  net  foreign  asset  holdings  on  the level  of  desired 
spending. When the relative price of domestic goods is expected to decline, 
domestic residents anticipate capital gains on their holdings of  assets denom- 
inated  in  terms of  imported goods.  The expectation  of  such capital  gains 
encourages domestic residents  to  save  more than  if  such gains were  not 
expected. Yet a third way  of justifying an influence of De(q)  on the current 
q that  is consistent with balance of  payments  equilibrium  is in terms of  the 36  Michael Mussa 
effect of  an anticipated change in q on  the temporal pattern of  desired trad- 
ing. If De(q)  is positive, then domestic residents have an incentive to expand 
purchases of domestic goods in the current period and to delay purchases of 
imported goods until they  are relatively cheaper. Foreign residents have a 
similar incentive to expand current purchases of goods exported by the home 
country and delay purchases of their own goods. Together, these forces tend 
to improve the balance of payments of the home country and hence to raise 
the q(t)  that is consistent with balance of payments equilibrium. 
The extent to which q(t)  exhibits the properties of  an  "asset  price"  that 
depends on expected future economic conditions, rather than only on current 
conditions, is determined by  the discount rate  A  that is given by  (28).  It  is 
apparent that for A  to be small,  v and p must be  small relative to (YU.  This 
makes sense. Expected future economic conditions should have considerable 
weight, relative to current economic conditions, in determining q(t)  if diver- 
gences between q(t)  and z(t) and between A(t)  and act) have relatively small 
effects on the balance of payments, in comparison with the effect of De(q). 
1.54 Dynamics of the Real Exchange Rate 
Analysis of the causes of changes in the real exchange rate may be carried 
out by  applying the general procedures of  section  1.3  to the results (24)- 
(28). Specifically, the expected change in the real exchange rate is given by 
(29)  D'[q(t)] = D'[q(t)] + y  - D'[A(t) -  A@)]. 
In  the  special case where  the long-run equilibrium exchange rate  and the 
long-run desired level of net foreign assets are not expected to change, this 
result simplifies to 
D'[q(t)] = y  D'[A(t)] = y  E(b(t);  t) 
where E(b(t);  t)  is the expected current account balance. In this special case, 
there is a positive relationship between D'[q(t)]  and E(b(t);  t).  More gener- 
ally, however, there is no guarantee of  such a relationship. The expectation 
of  rising values of  z implies a positive expected change in 4,  but a negative 
contribution to the expected current account balance. The intuitive explana- 
tion of  this relationship is  as follows: The expectation of  rising values of  z 
means that the expected demand for domestic goods is less strong, and the 
expected demand for  foreign  goods  is  more  strong,  in the current period 
than it will be, on average, in  future periods. The response to this situation 
is to allow the trade balance to go into deficit to absorb part of the strong 
demand for foreign goods and to reduce the relative price of domestic goods 
(increase the relative price of  foreign goods) in order to reduce the excess 
demand  for foreign goods in the current period  relative to  future periods. 
The result is a temporary expected deterioration in the current account com- 
bined with the expectation of  a rise in the relative price of domestic goods. 
If  this effect is sufficiently strong, it clearly could induce a negative, rather 37  The Theory of Exchange Rate Determination 
than a positive,  relationship between the expected change in q and the ex- 
pected current account balance. 
The unexpected  change  in the real  exchange rate,  D"[q(t)],  depends on 
the  unexpected  change  in  the  long-run  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate, 
D"[q(t)],  and the unexpected change in the difference between A  and A; 
(31)  D"[q(t)]  = D"[q(t)]  + y  D"[A(r) - A@)]. 
If  there are no unexpected changes in q or A,  then the unexpected change in 
q  will  depend exclusively on  the  unexpected  change in net  foreign assets 
which, in turn, must equal the "innovation"  in the current account balance; 
(32) 
More generally,  however, the unexpected change in q will reflect changes 
in  expectations about  future  z's and  future a's which  induce  unexpected 
changes in q and A.  To the extent that unexpected movements in the trade 
balance are one of  the sources of  information that lead to revisions of  ex- 
pectations concerning future z's and A's, there is an additional channel for 
such innovations to affect the real exchange rate.29 
D'[q(t)] = y  *  D"[A(t)]  = y -  [b(t) -  E(b(t);  t)]. 
1.6  Real and Monetary Factors in Exchange Rate Determination 
Models of  exchange rate behavior that focus on the condition of  balance 
of  payments equilibrium as the final determinant of  the exchange rate  are 
most  directly relevant to  understanding  the real economic forces affecting 
the behavior of  real  exchange rates.  In  contrast,  monetary models of  ex- 
change rate behavior are useful primarily in analyzing the influence of actual 
and anticipated movements in money supplies and money demands on nom- 
inal exchange rates.  To arrive at a theoretical model that comprehends all 
of  the factors that influence the actual behavior of  exchange rates, it is nec- 
essary to combine the essential features of  these two classes of  models. 
1.6 Monetization of the Real Model 
To analyze the influence of the real sector of the economy on its monetary 
sector and arrive at a combined model of the determination of real and nom- 
inal exchange rates,  it is convenient simply to expand the real model of  the 
preceding section by  introducing nominal prices and an appropriately speci- 
fied money demand function. The logarithm of the domestic money price of 
domestic goods is denoted by p;  the logarithm of  the foreign money price 
of  imported  (or traded) goods is  denoted by  p*; and  the logarithm of  the 
nominal  exchange rate  (defined as the domestic money  price of  a unit of 
foreign money) is denoted by e. These assumptions imply that the logarithm 
29.  The dynamic relationships  between the current account and the exchange rate  are ex- 
plored more fully in Mussa (1981a). 38  Michael Mussa 
of  the relative price of domestic  goods in terms of  imported  goods (previ- 
ously identified with the real exchange rate) is given by 
(33)  q = p  - (e + p*). 
The logarithm of the general price level in the home country, denoted by P, 
is a weighted  average  of  the  domestic  money  prices  of  domestic  and  im- 
ported goods. 
(34) 
where  u is the  same as  the  u of  the  preceding  section  and  measures  the 
weight of domestic goods in the expenditure of  residents of the home coun- 
try. 
(35)  md  = K  + L-P  -  N-i  - U-D‘(e) + W*A  + V-q. 
The parameter K represents all exogenous factors (such as real income) that 
affect money demand. The general price level affects money demand with a 
positive  elasticity,  L, which  could  equal  unity.  The exchange rate  affects 
money demand (because of wealth valuation or currency substitution effects) 
with an elasticity J  that is nonnegative.  The domestic nominal  interest rate, 
i, affects the demand  for money  with  a negative  semielasticity,  -N.  The 
expected  rate  of  change of  the  nominal  exchange rate,  D‘(e),  affects  the 
demand for domestic money through a “currency  substitution effect” which 
is represented  by  a  negative  semielasticity,  -  U. Net  holdings  of  foreign 
assets are assumed to affect the demand for domestic money with a positive 
semielasticity,  W.  Finally,  the relative price of domestic goods in terms of 
imported goods  affects the demand  for domestic money with  an elasticity, 
V,  which may be either positive or negati~e.~’ 
The money  demand function  specified  in  (35) may  be  converted  into a 
reduced-form  money  demand  function  that  is  similar  to  that  used  in  the 
simple  monetary  model of  exchange  rate  behavior  (see equation  [7]). The 
general  level  of domestic prices can be eliminated as an explicit  argument 
in  the  money  demand  function  by  substituting e  + p*  + aq for P. The 
domestic  nominal  interest rate can be  eliminated  from the  money  demand 
function by utilizing the Fisher equation. 
(36) 
where D‘(P) is the expected rate of change of the domestic price level and 
P  = u-p  + (1 - a).(e  + p*) = e  + p*  + u*y. 
The logarithm of the demand for domestic money is given by 
i = R -  D‘(P), 
30.  The relative price  of domestic goods could  affect money  demand because of  effects on 
the value of domestic product in terms of  imported  goods, on the distribution of  income within 
the home country, on the value of domestic nontraded assets in terms of imported goods, or on 
the rate of  return on such assets. In the next section, it will be assumed that whatever the signs 
of  all of  these effects, their cumulative impact is not very great. 39  The Theory of Exchange Rate Determination 
R  is the domestic  real  interest rate.  Repeating equation  (22), the domestic 
real  interest rate is given by 
(37)  R=r*- u - D'(q), 
where D'(q)  is the  expected  rate  of  change  of  q  and  r*  is the  exogenous 
foreign real interest rate. Further, assuming that expectations about domestic 
inflation take account of (34), it follows that 
(38) 
where T* = D"( p*) is the expected rate of change of the foreign  money 
price of  imported goods (i.e., the expected foreign inflation rate). Substitut- 
ing  the  right-hand  side of  (38) for D'(P)  in  (36),  and  making  all  of  the 
relevant substitutions in the money demand function (39, it follows that this 
money demand function can be rewritten  in the form 
(39) 
where 5 = L  + J  > 0 and q = N  + U > 0, and 
(40)  k  = K  + W-A  + (V + uL)*q 
(41)  K  = K  + L  * p* -  N*(r* + T*). 
The distinction between k and K is that k summarizes the influence on money 
demand of all factors that are exogenous to the monetary sector of the econ- 
omy (including the endogenous real variables q and A), while  K summarizes 
the influence on money demand of  all of the fully exogenous variables.  It is 
noteworthy that the reduced-form money demand function (39) is consistent 
with the interest parity condition 
D'(P) = D'(e) + n* + uD'(q), 
md  = k  + 5 *  e -  q * De(e), 
i  = i*  + D'(e) + x, 
where  i*  = r*  + T* is the  foreign  nominal  interest rate  and  x is  a risk 
premium that may be specified as any linear function of e, D'(e), A, q, and 
D'(q) .31 The derivation  of  the reduced-form  money  demand  function  (39) 
establishes  the point that the reduced-form  money market equilibrium con- 
dition specified in equation (7) of  section  1.3 is consistent with a very gen- 
eral specification of the structural factors influencing money demand. 
1.6.2 Solution of the Combined Real and Monetary Model 
The reduced-form  money market equilibrium condition (7), together with 
equations  (20) and (23) from the analysis of  balance of payments  equilib- 
31.  The implications of  such a risk premium in the foreign exchange market are explored in 
papers by  Kouri (1976b),  Stockman (1978),  and Fama  and Farber (1980). Some evidence of 
such a premium is provided  by Hansen and Hodrick (1982). The incorporation of such a risk 
premium in  the present model alters only the  structural interpretation of the parameters of the 
reduced-form money demand function. 40  Michael Mussa 
rium, constitute  a simultaneous  system  of difference  equations  that,  under 
the assumption of rational expectations, determines the expected future paths 
of  the  real  exchange rate,  q, the  net  stock  of  foreign  assets,  A, and  the 
nominal exchange rate, e, conditional on expectations concerning the future 
paths  of  the  exogenous  variables  z, A, and  m  - K. This system  can  be 
expressed in matrix form as 
(43) 
-1,  r* -  D' 
v -  *  De  - r*  :I  -q  *  D' 
A  key  property  of  this  dynamic  system  is determined  by  the  two  zeros 
that appear in  the  last column  of  the  matrix  on the left-hand  side of  (43). 
This property  implies that dynamic  system determining the expected future 
paths  of  the  two  real  variables,  q  and  A, is  independent  of  the  nominal 
exchange  rate and of the exogenous  monetary  forcing variables,  m - K. 
Indeed, the dynamic  system determining  the expected  paths of  q  and A  is 
identical to the dynamic system examined  in section  1.5. This implies that 
the behavior of these variables is exactly as described by the analysis in that 
section. Moreover, given the behavior of  q and A that is implied by the real 
subsystem of (43), we may  treat the money demand parameter  k  (which is 
defined by [40] as a variable that is exogenous to the monetary  sector of the 
economy); and  we  solve  for the  expected  future  path  of  the  nominal  ex- 
change rate  by  using  the  reduced-form  equilibrium  condition  given  in  (7). 
Thus, all  that  has been  said  in  the  preceding  two  sections concerning  the 
behavior of the  nominal  and real exchange rates remains valid  in the com- 
bined  real and monetary model. 
The fact that we determine the behavior of  the nominal exchange rate by 
using a reduced-form  model  of  monetary equilibrium, however, should not 
be allowed to obscure the important role that real variables play in determin- 
ing the behavior of  the nominal  exchange rate.  In  the reduced-form  mone- 
tary  model,  the  influence of  real  variables on the  nominal  exchange rate is 
all  subsumed  into  the  influence  of  such  variables  on  the  money  demand 
variable k. The influence of these real variables is brought into sharper focus 
by  writing the solution for the expected path  of the nominal  exchange rate 
implied by the system (43) in the form 
32 
32. If  desired expenditure were affected by  the  level  of  real  money  balances, then the real 
sector of  the economy would not be  independent of  monetary  influences. For some theoretical 
purposes, it  is useful  to assume that there is such a real balance effect. In the present context, 
however, the costs in terms of losing a convenient solution for the combined real and monetary 
model by  introducing this effect outweigh its benefits. 41  The Theory of Exchange Rate Determination 
(44) 
where 
E(e(s);  r) = E(F(s);  t) -  E(p*(s);  t) - u - E(q(s);  t) 
with 
(46)  x = K -  N  *  r*  + V *  [D'(p*) + u  * D'(q)] 
+ W-A  + V-q. 
F(s)  is a weighted sum of differences between (the logarithm of) the nominal 
money supply, m, and the money demand shift variable, x, defined by (46). 
The economic significance of F(s)  is that its expected value is the common 




Comparing the results (44),  (47), (48),  and (49), it is apparent that move- 
ments  in  E(F(s);  t) are  accommodated by  equal  movements  in  (the loga- 
rithms) of all nominal prices (measured in terms of domestic money). Move- 
ments  in  E(p*(s);  r) are  accommodated  by  offsetting  movements  in  the 
nominal  exchange  rate  which  leave all  domestic  money  prices  unaltered. 
Movements  in  E(q(s); t) are  accommodated  partly  by  movements  in  the 
nominal  exchange  rate  (and  corresponding  movements  in  the  domestic 
money price of imported goods) and partly by movements  in the domestic 
money price of  domestic goods, thereby  allowing the  general  level of do- 
mestic prices, E(P(s);  t), to remain unaltered. 
1.6.3  Exchange Rate Dynamics 
following expression for the current nominal exchange rate: 
(50) 
Applying the general procedures of  section  1.3 to (50), it follows that the 
expected change in the exchange rate is given by 
(51) 
E(p(s);  t) = E(F(s);  t) + (1 - a)  *  E(q(s);  t) 
E((e(s) + p*(s)>;  0  = E(F(s);  0 - u *  E(q(4;  t) 
E(P(s);  t) = E(F(s);  t). 
Assuming that all current prices are observable, we obtain from (44) the 
e(t) = E(F(t);  t) -  p*(t) - u - q(t). 
D'[e(t)l  = DV"t)l  -  o'[p*(t)l - uD'[q(t)l, 
where D'[p*(t)] = .rr*(t) is whatever people expect to be the rate of inflation 
in  the foreign country, De[q(t)]  is determined by  (29), and 
(52)  De[F(t)l = [5/(5  +  -$I.  {E(F(t  +  1);  t) 
- W5)  *  [m(t) -  x(r)l). 42  Michael Mussa 
The unexpected change in the exchange rate is given by 
(53) 
where D"[p*(t)]  is the unexpected  component  of the foreign inflation  rate, 
D"[q(t)]  is determined by (31),  and 
D"[e(t)]  = D"[F(t)] - D"[p*(t)] - u - D"[q(t)l, 
m 
DUIF(t)l = [la  + rl)l  - 2 "5  + q)lj 
j=O 
(54) 
-  [E((m(t  + j  +  1) -  x(t + j  +  1)); t  +  1) 
-  E((m(t + j +  1) -  x(t + j  +  I));  t)]. 
The general  principle  that  is embodied  in  all of  these results  is that the 
change  in  the  nominal  exchange  rate  reflects  expected  and  unexpected 
changes  in  the entire  future time paths  of  the  exogenous  forcing  variables 
that  ultimately  drive the  behavior  of  the  economy.  One of  these  forcing 
variables  is (the logarithm  of) the nominal  money  supply,  m. Its influence 
on  (the logarithm  of)  the  nominal  exchange  rate,  e(t), comes through  the 
term E(F(t);  t) that involves an exponentially  weighted  sum of current and 
expected  future  m's. Since E(F(t);  t) is  common  to  all  nominal  prices,  it 
follows that expected and unexpected changes in F(t) which are induced by 
expected  and  unexpected  changes  in  m  imply  expected  and  unexpected 
changes  in  the exchange rate  which  are equal  (proportionately) to the cor- 
responding  expected  and  unexpected changes  in all domestic money prices 
and hence are consistent with purchasing power parity. 
Another exogenous variable that affects the nominal  exchange rate is the 
foreign  money  price  of  imported  goods, p*. It  is apparent  from  (51) and 
(53) that expected and unexpected changes in p* induce offsetting expected 
and  unexpected  changes in  e  which  insulate domestic nominal  prices  from 
purely nominal disturbances  in the foreign money price of  imported goods. 
In  addition,  expected  changes in p*  may  influence  e  through  a  currency 
substitution  effect  on  domestic  money  demand,  as  captured  by  the  term 
U  *  D'(p*) appearing in the money demand parameter n defined in  (46). 
Real forcing  variables  affect the dynamic behavior of  the  exchange  rate 
through two distinct channels. First, the real forcing variables z and a which 
enter into the determination  of q (in the manner described  in the preceding 
section)  affect  the  expected  and  unexpected  change  in  the  exchange rate 
through the terms -  u  D'[q(t)]  and -  u . D"[q(t)]  that appear in (5 1) and 
(53). It  is  apparent  that  these  contributions  to the  change  in  the  nominal 
exchange  rate,  which  are  associated  with  changes in  the  relative  price  of 
domestic goods, give rise to deviations from purchasing power parity.  Sec- 
ond, real  forcing  variables  affect the change  in  the  nominal  exchange rate 
through their influence  on expected  and unexpected changes in the real de- 
mand for domestic  money.  In particular,  the forcing variable  K directly af- 
fects  the  demand  for money, and the  forcing  variables  z  and a indirectly 43  The Theory of Exchange Rate Determination 
affect the demand for money through effects on the terms W .  A,  and (V + 
uL) q that appear in the composite forcing variable x defined in (46). Since 
these effects come through the terms D‘[F(t)]  and D”[F(t)]  that are common 
to changes in  all  nominal  prices, it  is apparent  that  they  induce exchange 
rate changes that are consistent with purchasing  power parity. 
1.7  Sticky Prices and Disequilibrium Dynamics 
The combined real and monetary model of  the preceding  section assumes 
complete neutrality  of  money  and  allows no latitude  for monetary  distur- 
bances to have real  effects on output  levels or relative prices.  One way  of 
modifying  this result  is by assuming that  some nominal  price is sticky and 
does not adjust immediately to its equilibrium value.33 Usually, the nominal 
wage rate would be chosen as this sticky price; but, because  the wage rate 
does not appear in our model, the domestic money price of  domestic goods 
is selected to play this role. An adjustment rule that governs the behavior of 
this  sticky  price  which  may  be  derived from a  microeconomic  theory  of 
price  adjustment and  shown to  have desirable  mathematical  properties  is 
given by 
(55) 
where p is (the logarithm of) the “conditional  equilibrium price” of  domes- 
tic goods.34 The “conditional equilibrium  price”  of  domestic goods is de- 
fined as the price that  would  yield  equilibrium  in the  market  for domestic 
goods (and in all other markets)  conditional  on the actual expected  path of 
net  foreign  assets.35 The  first  term  in  the  price  adjustment  rule,  De(p), 
causes the  actual price of  domestic goods to move  in  line with  expected 
changes in  its conditional  equilibrium  value.  The second  term  in the price 
D(p) = D‘  (p) + 6 . (p -  p),  6 > 0, 
33. This approach corresponds to “contracting  approach”  to introducing monetary nonneu- 
tralities  into  macroeconomic  models  that  has  been  developed  by  Fisher  (1977), Phelps  and 
Taylor (1977), and Taylor (1980). An  alternative approach is that developed by  Lucas (1972, 
1973,  1975), Sargent  and  Wallace  (1975), and  Barro  (1976) which  emphasizes  incomplete 
information as the source of  nonneutral effects of monetary disturbances.  Differences between 
these  approaches  with  respect  to  their  implications  for the  usefulness of  stabilization  policy 
should cany over from closed to open economy models. For applications of these approaches 
to open economy macroeconomic models, see Flood (1979), Saidi (1980) and  1982), Stockman 
(1980), and Buiter and Miller (1981, 1982). 
34. The economic justification  for the assumption  of  this  form of  price adjustment rule  is 
discussed in Mussa (1981b, 19828). 
35.  The full equilibrium  price  of  domestic goods  is  calculated on the assumption that do- 
mestic holdings of net foreign assets will  follow their equilibrium path. When there is disequi- 
librium, the actual path  of  net foreign assets will  not correspond to this full equilibrium path. 
For  reasons of  analytical  convenience  it  is useful to  specify  that the conditional  equilibrium 
price of  domestic  goods plays the  role of  the equilibrium  price  in the price  adjustment rule. 
Designation of the full equilibrium price to play this role would not alter the basic conclusions 
of the analysis of this section, but it would make the analysis more complicated. 44  Michael Mussa 
adjustment  rule, 6  *  (p -  p), causes  any gap between  the  actual  and  the 
conditional  equilibrium  price of domestic  goods to be eliminated at an ex- 
ponential rate 6. 
1.7.1 The Disequilibrium Situation 
When the inherited value of p(t)  differs from p(t),  there is disequilibrium 
in the market for domestic goods.  Consistent with the assumption that pro- 
ducers  of  these  goods are  holding  their  prices  temporarily  fixed,  it  is  as- 
sumed  that  this  disequilibrium  is  absorbed  by  variations  in the  output  of 
domestic goods. Formally, this assumption is represented by specifying that 
(56) 
where  y  denotes the  deviation  of  the  value  of  output  of  domestic  goods 
from  its  equilibrium  level,  d*  is  the  value  of  foreign  excess  demand 
for domestic goods, and d is the excess of the value of domestic demand for 
domestic goods over the equilibrium level of output of  such goods. 
The value of foreign excess demand  for domestic goods, d*, is still de- 
termined by (12), namely, 
y  = d + d*, 
(57) 
There must be some modification, however, in the specification  of  d andf 
to take account  of the  disequilibrium  situation;  specifically,  (13)  and  (14) 
are replaced by 
(58)  f  =(l-u).*+  p.q-x+(l-a).(l-~)*y 
(59) 
where + is the excess of the equilibrium level of domestic spending over the 
equilibrium  value  of  domestic  output, and  5  is the  marginal propensity  to 
save out of a disequilibrium  increase in the value of  domestic output. 
Since, by  assumption,  disequilibrium  does not affect domestic output  of 
foreign goods (if such goods are produced domestically),  the excess of do- 
mestic demand for such goods over the equilibrium level of domestic output 
of such goods, which  is measured byf, corresponds to the actual domestic 
excess demand for such goods even in the disequilibrium  situation.  It  fol- 
lows that the trade balance of the home country, T,  is given by 
(W 
where, as before, v = (p + p*)/u and z  = (x + x*)/(p  + p*). Substitut- 
ing (57) and (59) into the disequilibrium  market-clearing condition  (56), it 
is easily shown that 
(61) 
d = u . * - p . q + x  + u . (1-5)  *  y, 
T=d*-  f = u.v.(z -  q) -  (1 - u) 
-+  - (1 - U)'(1 - 0-y 
qJ  = u  -  (q -  z)  + [(l - u + .$T)/u]  - y. 45  The Theory of  Exchange Rate Determination 
Substitution of (61) into (60) yields the result that 
(62)  T  =  -(*  - 5-y)  = u.(z - q) - [(l - u)/u]*y. 
This result  (which  is  the  analogue  of  [IS])  expresses  the  equivalence  be- 
tween the absorption  and elasticities approaches to the trade balance when 
the economy is in di~equilbriurn.~~ 
The budget constraints and accounting identities which must apply in dis- 
equilibrium  as well as equilibrium situations imply that the rate of accumu- 
lation of net foreign assets by home residents must equal the current account 
balance of the home country; hence 
(63) 
Further, adding disequilibrium savings, 5 - y,  to the equilibrium desired ex- 
cess of domestic income over domestic  spending,  r*A - $ =  -auD'(q) 
+  p(A - A), it  follows that the  modified  version  of  the  balance  of  pay- 
ments equilibrium condition that is relevant in disequilibrium is given by 
(64)  u  -  (z -  q) + r*  -A  - [(I - a)/cr] *  y  = 
D(A) = b = u -  (z - q) + r*  A -  ((1 - u)/u)  - y. 
-a~.D'(q)  + p'(A  -A) + 5.y. 
The money market equilibrium condition must also be modified to take ac- 
count of disequilibrium  variations in  the value of domestic output (and do- 
mestic income) on the demand for domestic money. Specifically, adding an 
amount o  - y to the money demand function (33, it follows that the modi- 
fied condition of money market equilibrium can be written as 
(65)  5-e  - q*De(e)  + W-A  + (V + uL).q 
f 0.y  = m -  K, 
where K is the exogenous money demand parameter defined in  (41). 
1.7.2 Expected Convergence toward Conditional Equilibrium 
Under  the  assumption  of  rational  expectations,  the  difference  equations 
(63), (64),  and (65) are three of the four equations that are required for the 
system that determines the expected paths of the four endogenous variables, 
q, A, e, and y, conditional  on  the  expected  future paths  of  the  exogenous 
forcing variables. To complete this system, we tentatively  assume that 
36.  From  the perspective  of  the  absorption  approach, the trade  balance  is  given by  T  = 
-(+  - 6  .  y).  and  it  appears  that  a disequilibrium  increase  in  income improves  the  trade 
balance (since some of this income is saved). From the prospective of  the elasticities approach, 
the  trade  balance  is  given  by  T  =  v . (z - 4) - [(I  - u)lu] .  y, and  it  appears  that  a 
disequilibrium  increase  in  income worsens the trade  balance  (since it increases domestic de- 
mand for foreign goods).  The two results are consistent,  however,  because for the absorption 
approach we are implicitly holding + constant,  while for the elasticities approach we are im- 
plictly holding 4  constant. 46  Michael Mussa 
(66) 
where A is a constant whose value is yet to be determined. If  (66) is valid, 
then it follows from the price adjustment rule (61) that 
y  = A.  (p -  P), 
(67)  D'(y) = A*D'[(p -  p)] =  -6*A*@  -  p)  =  -6.y. 
This difference equation completes the system required to determine the ex- 
pected paths of q, A, e, and y. 
The assumption of  (66) is justified by showing that under this assumption 
all variables converge to their respective  conditional  equilibrium  values (on 
an expected basis) in a consistent and correct manner. In the process of  this 
demonstration, the appropriate  value  of  the coefficient  A  is  derived.  The 
definition of  the concept of  conditional  equilibrium  implies that the current 
conditional equilibrium values of  all  endogenous variables  (which are  de- 
noted  by a tilde) must satisfy the equations of  the combined real  and mon- 
etary model  developed in  sections  1.4-1.6.37  In  particular,  since q and e 
must be consistent with the balance of payments equilibrium  condition and 
the  money  market  equilibrium  condition,  it  follows  that  the  deviations 
4 -  4 and e -  2 must satisfy the conditions38 
(68)  v-(q  - 4) - [(l - u)/u]*y  = 
-  (Yu  *  D'(q -  4)  + F,  * y, 
(69)  5 -  (e - 2) - q  - D'(e -  5)  + (V + uL) 
-(q -  4)  + w-y  = 0. 
Further, consistent with  (66) and (67), it may be assumed that  q and e are 
expected to converge to their  respective  conditional  equilibrium  values, q 
and 6, at the same exponential  rate 6 that characterizes  the expected  speed 
of  convergence  of  p  to p. This  implies  that  the  terms  D'(q  4)  and 
D'(e  - 2) appearing in  (68)  and  (69) can be  replaced  by  -6  *  (q - 4) 
and  -6  (e - a), respectively.  In  addition, the  deviation  e - 2  can  be 
replaced  by  (p  - p) - (q - 4).  The modified  versions  of  (68) and  (69) 
that  result  from these  substitutions  constitute  a  linear  system  in  the  three 
variables y, q -  4,  and p  -  p,  which may be solved to obtain the results 
(70) 
- 
q - 4 = n.(p -  p) 
37.  The only difference between the conditional equilibrium and  full equilibrium is that in 
conditional  equilibrium  we  allow  for the disequilibrium  behavior  of  net  foreign  assets.  This 
difference does not  affect the applicability of  the equilibrium conditions described in previous 
sections to the conditional equilibrium values of economic variables. 
38.  To derive these  results,  note  (64)  and  (65) are satistied  when  q  =  4,  e  =  2,  and 
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where 
1 
(72)  R= 
OU 
1- [: ___  1 
+
  [I  - u + su][vc:;s]' 
It is apparent that (71) is equivalent to (66) under the stipulation that 
(73)  A  = [~/(l  - u + SIT)] *  (V + (YU~)  * R. 
Further, using the fact that (e -  2) = (p -  p) -  (q -  q),  it follows that 
(74) 
The results  (70)-(74)  justify  the  initial assumption of  (66) and  the future 
assumption that deviations of  p,  q, and e from their respective conditional 
equilibrium values are expected to be eliminated that the exponential rate 8. 
The results (72) and (73) give the appropriate value of  the coefficient A. 
These results permit a reasonably simple description of  the state of dis- 
equilibrium of  the  economy at any moment  and of  how  this state of  dis- 
equilibrium is expected to evolve over time as the economy converges to- 
ward  its  equilibrium  path.  The  state  of  disequilibrium  is  determined 
completely by  the divergence between  the  inherited value of  p(t) and the 
conditional equilibrium value of this price, p(t). This divergence determines 
the deviation of  the value of  output of  domestic goods from its equilibrium 
level, y(t) =  -A  *  [p(t) - p(t)], and  also the deviations of  the relative 
price of  domestic goods and the exchange rate from their respective condi- 
tional equilibrium values, q(t) -  q(t) = R -  [p(t) -  p(t)]  and e(t) -  t(t) = 
@ *  [p(t) -  p(t)].  Over time, it is expected that the price of  domestic goods 
will converge toward its conditional equilibrium value at an exponential rate 
6. Correspondingly,  the  deviation  of  the  value of  the  value of  domestic 
output from its equilibrium level, y,  and the deviations of q and e from their 
respective conditional equilibrium values are also expected to disappear at 
the exponential rate 8.39 
From all of  these results, it is apparent that the coefficients A, R, and @ 
are of  critical importance in determining the magnitude of  the effects dis- 
equilibrium created by divergences between p  and p on other economic var- 
iables.  Consider  first the  coefficient 0 which  determines the response of 
q - q to p  - p. There is  a strong presumption that R > 0 and  weaker 
e - t = @*(p  -  p),  @ = (1 - a). 
39. This same basic description of the state and expected evolution of disequilibrium applies 
to other endogenous variables of the economic system. In  particular, if we assume that there is 
no risk premium  in  the foreign exchange  market,  then  using the  interest parity condition (42) 
we  may  show  that  the  deviation  of  the  domestic  nominal interest  rate  from  its  conditional 
equilibrium value is given by  (i - i) =  -80 .  (p -  p). As disequilibrium is eliminated, the 
domestic nominal interest rate is expected to converge toward its conditional equilibrium value 
at  the exponential rate 6. 48  Michael Mussa 
presumption  that R > 1. The only thing that could  make R negative is if 
V  + uL  were  significantly greater than  5 + q6.  But,  going back to (39), 
we find that 5  = L  + J  which is definitely greater than uL.  Thus, the only 
thing that  could  make R < 0 is if  V were  strongly positive,  that  is, if  an 
increase  in the  relative  price of  domestic  goods  had  a strong effect  of  in- 
creasing  the  nominal  demand  for  domestic  money.  There is no  reason  to 
suppose that this relative price should have such a strong effect on nominal 
money demand. The weak presumption  that R > 1 comes from the notion 
that transitory changes in income associated with disequilibrium should have 
relatively weak effects on the demand  for money.  If this notion  is correct, 
then the parameter w which indicates the response of money demand to the 
deviation of the value of output from its equilibrium level should be small. 
If  w is small, then the third term in the denominator of R in (72) should be 
smaller (in absolute value) than the second term in this denominator,  imply- 
ing that R > 1. 
The conclusion  that R > 1  is of  critical  importance  for the  sign of  the 
coefficient  @ and hence for the phenomenon  of  “exchange rate overshoot- 
ing.’’  If R > 1, then  @  = 1 - R < 0, and from (74) it follows that e - 
t  is inversely related to p  -  p.  In this case, we have Dombusch’s phenom- 
enon of  “exchange rate overshooting,”  in the sense that an increase in the 
conditional  equilibrium  price of domestic goods relative to the actual price 
of  such  goods  (induced  by  an  unexpected  increase  in  the  money  supply) 
causes  the  actual  exchange rate  to increase  by  even more  than  the  condi- 
tional equilibrium exchange rate.  In the present model, however, overshoot- 
ing of the exchange rate in response to monetary disturbances is not assured. 
If money demand responds strongly to deviations of the value of output from 
its  equilibrium  level  (w  is  large), or  if  increases  in  the  relative  price  of 
domestic goods have a strong negative effect on money demand (V is large 
and  negative),  then  R  may  be  less  than  one and  @  =  1 - R  may  be 
positive.  In  this  case,  the  actual  exchange  rate  will  rise  by  less  than  the 
conditional  equilibrium  exchange rate  in  response  to  an  unanticipated  in- 
crease in the money supply that increases p  relative to p.40 
The coefficient A determines the response of the value of domestic output 
to divergences  between p  and p.  From  (73) it follows that  the  strong pre- 
sumption  that  R is  positive  translates  into a strong presumption  that  A  is 
positive.  Since y  =  -A  - (p -  p),  a positive A  means that y  is negatively 
related  to p  - 9. As  one should expect, a high  value of  p  implies a low 
demand for domestic goods, and the producers of  these goods (who tempo- 
rarily  hold  their  price  fixed)  respond  to this  low  demand  by  reducing  the 
value of output of  such goods below its equilibrium level. 
40.  In  Dornbusch’s (1976) original analysis of exchange rate overshooting,  it is recognized 
that a strong response of income to an  increase in  the money supply may counteract the normal 
overshooting effect of a monetary disturbance. 49  The Theory of  Exchange Rate Determination 
1.7.3 Disequilibrium  Dynamics 
The preceding  analysis indicates  how  current state of  disequilibrium  in 
the economy, at time I, is determined  by  the divergence between p(t) and 
its  conditional  equilibrium value  p(t), and how  this  disequilibrium  is  ex- 
pected  to disappear, at the exponential  rate 6, as the economy converges 
toward its conditional  equilibrium path.  To obtain  the complete picture  of 
the dynamic behavior of  the economy it  is also necessary  to describe how 
the  conditional  equilibrium price  of  domestic goods  and  the  conditional 
equilibrium values  of  other endogenous variables  are expected to change 
over time, how these  expectations are altered by  the receipt  of  new  infor- 
mation,  and  how  new  disequilibrium  is  generated  within  the  economic 
system. 
To obtain the correct expressions for the expected conditional equilibrium 
paths of the endogenous variables of the economic system, it is only neces- 
sary to modify  slightly the results which  describe the expected equilibrium 
paths of  these variables in the combined real and monetary model of section 
1.6.  Specifically,  the  solutions for the  expected value of  an  endogenous 
variable qs a weighted sum of expected future values of the exogenous forc- 
ing variables z, a, and w  = (1/{)  - (m -  k) give the correct expressions for 
the expected conditional equilibrium value of that variable provided that 
(75)  z (t + j)  is replaced by z(t + j) - [(l - u)/vu] 
A(r  + j)  is replaced by A(t + j)  + (up,)  *  (1 - 
w(t + j)  is replaced by w(t + j)  + o  *  (1 -  6)’  y(t), 
*  (1 -  6Y-y(t) 
- y(t) 
where y(t) is determined by the divergence  between p(t) and p(t) in accord 
with y(t) = A - u(t)  -  p(t)l. 
From (75) it is apparent  that if there is no disequilibrium  at time c,  then 
all of the forcing variables have the same values as in the equilibrium anal- 
ysis, and hence the expected conditional equilibrium paths of all endogenous 
variables  correspond exactly to the expected full equilibrium paths of these 
variables.  Further, since the terms involving y(t)  in (75) (which are respon- 
sible for all  differences between the expected full equilibrium  and the ex- 
pected  conditional equilibrium values  of  endogenous variables)  all  decay 
with a factor (1 - Sy’,  it follows that conditional  equilibrium value of any 
endogenous  variable  is  expected to converge toward  its  full  equilibrium 
value at the exponential  rate 6.  For example, from (75) it follows  that  the 
difference between the current conditional equilibrium exchange rate and the 
current full equilibrium exchange rate-denoted by Z(t)-can be written as 
(76)  qt) -  qt) = e .  ~(t)  = eh  -  [p(t) -  p(t)i, 
where 8 is a  coefficient  that  is made up of  weighted  sums of  the factors 
multiplying y(t) in (75). Applying the expected forward difference operator 50  Michael Mussa 
to (76) and taking  account of the price adjustment  rule  (55), we determine 
the  expected rate  of  convergence of  the conditional  equilibrium  exchange 
rate toward its full equilibrium value, 
(77)  De[e(t) -  Z(t)] =  -6A  *  [P(t) -  p(t)] 
=  -6  *  [C(t) -  Z(t)]. 
Similar results  can be derived for the expected rate of  convergence of  the 
conditional equilibrium values of other variables,  such as the real exchange 
rate, toward their full equilibrium values. 
Expected changes in  the actual  values  of  endogenous variables  can,  in 
general, be decomposed into three parts: (i) the expected change in the full 
equilibrium value of  the variable;  as determined  by  the combined real  and 
monetary  model of  section  1.6; (ii) the expected convergence of  the actual 
value of a variable toward its conditional  equilibrium value, which is equal 
to  -6 times the existing divergence between  the actual and the conditional 
equilibrium  value of the variable; and (iii) the expected convergence of  the 
conditional  equilibrium  value  of  the  variable  toward  its  full  equilibrium 
value, which is equal to -  6 times the existing divergence between the con- 
ditional  and full  equilibrium values  of  the variables.  In particular,  for the 
nominal exchange rate we have 
(78)  D'[e(t)] = D'[Z(t)] - 6 *  [e(t)  ~  6(t)] 
-6 .  [i?(t) -  Z(t)] 
= D'[Z(t)] - 6  *  (9A -  @) .  [P(t) -  p(t)], 
where D'[Z(t)] is given by the result (51). Similar results apply for the ex- 
pected changes in the actual values of  other endogenous variables. 
The state of  disequilibrium  which  influences expected  changes in all en- 
dogenous variables  is itself the consequence of past unexpected  changes in 
the conditional  equilibrium price of domestic goods. Specifically,  since the 
price adjustment rule (55) specifies that the expected  change in p  is incor- 
porated  into the actual  change in p, it  follows  that  the  innovation  in  dis- 
equilibrium between  t  and t  +  1  corresponds  to the unexpected  change in 
the conditional equilibrium price of domestic goods, 
(79) 
The total  change in  disequilibrium  is the  sum of  this  innovation  and the 
expected change D'[p(t) -  p(t)] = - 6  *  [p(t) -  p(t)],  that is, 
(80) 
Taking the backward-looking  solution  of  this  difference equation, we find 
that the existing state of disequilibrium  is a weighted average of past unex- 
pected changes in the conditional equilibrium price of domestic goods; 
D"[m  -  p(t)l = D"M;(t)l. 
D[P(t> -  pWl  = D"[P(t)l - 6 *  [P(r) -  p(r)l. 51  The Theory of Exchange Rate Determination 
s 
p(t) -  p(t) = 6 * 2 (1 - 6)'  - ~"[p(t  -  j - I)]. 
j=O 
(81) 
Unexpected  changes  in  the  conditional  equilibrium  price  of  domestic 
goods that are the fundamental source of disequilibrium must themselves be 
the result of changes in expectations about the exogenous forcing variables, 
z,  a, and  w,  that  ultimately  determine p. In  particular,  exploiting  (47), it 
follows that 
(82)  p(t) = E(F(c);  t) + (1 
-  - ~(qt);  t) + r - y(~), 
where F(t) is the  weighted  sum of differences  between  money supply and 
money demand  defined  in (45), ;(t)  represents the full equilibrium relative 
price of  domestic  goods as determined  by  the present  stock  of  net  foreign 
assets  and  the present  and  future  values of  the  forcing variables  z  and A, 
and r is the coefficient that  indicates effect of y(r) on p(t)  implied by  the 
modifications  of  the  forcing  variables  listed  in  (75).  Applying  the  unex- 
pected difference  operator  to (83) and  making use of (66) and (80), it fol- 
lows that 
(83) 
where the presumption  is that  1  + AT  > 0. 
The price  adjustment  rule  (55) prescribes  that D"[p(t)]  has  no effect on 
the actual price of domestic goods in  period  t  +  1, but is instead absorbed 
by the state of  disequilibrium at r  + 1. Because of its effect on the state of 
disequilibrium,  however, D"[p(t)]  does influence the magnitudes of the un- 
expected changes in the values of all other endogenous variables between t 
and  I  +  1 by  affecting both  the divergence  between  the  actual  value of  a 
variable  and  its  conditional  equilibrium  value  and the  divergence  between 
the  conditional  equilibrium  value  of  the  variable  and  its  full  equilibrium 
value.  For  example,  from  (74)  and  (76)  it  follows  that  the  unexpected 
change in the nominal exchange rate is given by 
(84) 
The first factor affecting D'[e(t)]  is the unexpected change in the full equi- 
librium exchange rate, D"[.?(t)],  as determined by (53). The second factor is 
the  combined  effect  of  the  innovation  in  disequilibrium,  D"[P(t)],  on  the 
divergences between  t? and 
D"@(t)]  = [  1/(  1  + xr)]  -  {D"(E(F(t);  t)) 
+ (1 - u) *  D"r;i(t>l>, 
D"[e(t)]  = D"[Z(t)]  + (OA - a)  * D"[p(t)]. 
and between e and 2. 
1.7.4 Disequilibrium Effects of Real and Monetary Disturbances 
The principal  advantage  of  disequilibrium  model  of  the  present  section 
over the  equilibrium  model  of  the  previous  section  is its  capacity  to  deal 
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their effects on real output and on the real exchange rate. Since unexpected 
changes in the conditional equilibrium price of domestic goods are the fun- 
damental  source of  disequilibrium, it  follows  from (83) that  “real  distur- 
bances”  may conveniently be identified with unexpected  changes in the full 
equilibrium relative  price of  domestic goods, D”[G(t)],  and  “monetary  dis- 
turbances”  may be identified with unexpected  changes in the common ele- 
ment  in  the  full  equilibrium values  of  all  nominal prices, D”(E(F(t);  t)). 
These disturbances would be “transitory”  if the change in expectations due 
to new information received between t and t  + 1 affected only expectations 
about the exogenous real and monetary factors (the z’s, a’s, and w’s) in the 
near  future  and  left  expectations concerning  their  longer-run  values  un- 
changed. These disturbances would be “permanent”  if the new information 
altered expectations concerning the exogenous real and monetary factors by 
approximately the same amount for all future periods. 
With respect to their effects on the disequilibrium  component of domestic 
output  (and  income),  real  and monetary  disturbances have essentially  the 
same effects in the sense that positive  values of D”[T(t)] and D”(E(F(t);  t)) 
both induce positive innovations in y;  formally, 
(85)  D”b(t)] = X  - D”[P(t)]  =  [A/(I  + Ar)] 
-  {~“(-aF(t);  t)) 
+ (1 - a)  - D”[7(t)]}. 
Moreover, for a given size disturbance, either real or monetary, it makes no 
difference for its effect on y  whether the disturbance  is transitory or perma- 
nent. As indicated  by  (66) and (81), however, the effect of  any particular 
disturbance on y  decays with  the  passage  of  time  and the actual  price  of 
domestic  goods gradually  adjusts  toward  its conditional  equilibrium  value. 
Thus, a continuing sequence of real and monetary disturbances  is necessary 
to sustain deviations of output from its equilibrium level. 
With respect to their effects on the real exchange rate, there are important 
differences between  real and monetary disturbances  and between  permanent 
and transitory disturbances. Formally, using the fact that q -  q = p -  p - 
(e - 2) and  cj - 7 = p -  - (2 - T), together  with the results  (74), 
(76), and (82), we may reach the conclusion that 
with A  = 1 - 0  + OX - TA,  where the presumption is that A > 0.41  The 
right-hand  side of  (86)  measures  the  effect  of  disequilibrium  on the  real 
exchange rate (which is identified with the relative price of domestic goods). 
41.  Using (73) and (74) it may be  shown that A  =  1  + I1 .  {I  + (0 - r)  *  [u/(1 - u + 
@)I  . (u + ad)}.  As  previously  discussed, there  is  a  strong presumption  that 0  > 0. The 
term multiplying I1  in the expression for A  is also likely to be positive,  except in the unlikely 
event that (0 - r)  is both large and negative.  Even if the term multiplying 0 is negative,  it is 
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Applying  the expected  and unexpected  change  operators  to (86) yields the 
results 
(87)  ~"s(t)l  = De[7(t)l - sls(t) - 301 
(88) 
Thus, the  expected  change in  the real  exchange rate  reflects  both  the  ex- 
pected  change in  the  full equilibrium  real  exchange rate  and the  expected 
convergence  of  the  actual  real  exchange  rate  toward  its  full  equilibrium 
value. The unexpected change in the real exchange rate reflects both the full 
equilibrium effect of the real disturbances measured by Du[7(t)]  and the dis- 
equilibrium  effect  of  the  real  and  monetary  disturbances  summarized  by 
D"@(t)].  It is noteworthy that full equilibrium effect of real disturbances on 
the real exchange rate will be permanent  if  the disturbances themselves are 
permanent, but that disequilibrium  effect or real and monetary disturbances 
on the  real  exchange rate  must  be  transitory,  even  if  the  disturbances  are 
permanent, because the effect of any individual disturbance on the state of 
disequilibrium decays with the passage of time. 
Further  insight into the effects of real  and monetary  disturbances on the 
real exchange rate comes from substituting (83) into (88): 
D"[q(t)]  = D"[7(t)] - AD"@(t)]. 
(89)  D"[q(t)]  = [l - (1 - U)  *  TI 
.  D"[G(t)] - T * D*(E(F(t);  t)), 
where T  =  A/(l  - FA).  The second term  on the  right-hand  side of  (89) 
measures  the effect  of  monetary  disturbances.  This effect  is exclusively  a 
disequilibrium  effect  which does not  arise in the full equilibrium model of 
the  preceding  section.  If  the  nominal  exchange rate  "overshoots"  in  re- 
sponse to monetary disturbances-in  the sense that DU(E(F(t);  t)  has a more 
than one-for-one effect on D"[e(t)]-then  the coefficient T must be positive, 
and the real  exchange rate must decline in response to a positive monetary 
disturbance.  The first term on the right-hand  side of (89) measures the com- 
bined equilibrium and disequilibrium effects of real disturbances on the real 
exchange rate.  It is apparent that if the nominal exchange rate overshoots in 
response  to monetary  disturbances  (for  which  the  necessary  and  sufficient 
condition is T > 0), then the real exchange rate must undershoot in response 
to real disturbances or, in the extreme case where (1 -  a)  - T > 1, the real 
exchange rate  may  move  in the opposite direction to the change in its full 
equilibrium value in response to real disturbances. 
These results  are directly  relevant  to the  explanation  of  deviations  from 
purchasing power parity, which are identified, one for one, with movements 
in the real exchange rate. In an economy where the prices of domestic goods 
are not immediately adjusted to unexpected changes in their equilibrium val- 
ues,  monetary  disturbances  will  induce  temporary  divergences  from  pur- 
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rary deviations from purchasing power parity through both their equilibrium 
and disequilibrium effects.  It  is not necessary, however, that all deviations 
from purchasing  power parity be  temporary.  Permanent  real  disturbances 
will require permanent adjustments in the relative price of  domestic goods 
and hence permanent changes in the real exchange rate. 
1.8  Summary and Extensions 
It is desirable that theoretical models of  exchange rate determination be 
consistent with  the empirical regularities that  have generally characterized 
the  actual behavior  of  floating exchange rates.  This requires  that  the  ex- 
change rate be treated as an asset price that is affected not only by  currefit 
economic conditions but  also,  to  an  important  extent,  by  expectations of 
future economic conditions. In  such an asset price model, there is a general 
explanation of  how new  information that alters expectations concerning fu- 
ture economic conditions induces unexpected changes in exchange rates and 
of  why such unexpected changes may dominate actual exchange rate move- 
ments. There is also an explanation of the empirically observed phenomenon 
that spot and forward exchange rates tend to move together, especially when 
there are fairly large changes. In such an asset price model of  the exchange 
rate,  it  is  desirable that  the behavior of  national  money  supplies and  the 
demands to hold these monies play an important role in  influencing the be- 
havior of exchange rates, but, consistent with the observed facts, the model 
should not insist on too rigid a link between movements in money supplies 
and  movements  in  exchange rates.  It  is  also desirable that  the  model  of 
exchange rate determination allow for variations in real exchange rates (and 
hence deviations from purchasing power parity) and that it permit real eco- 
nomic conditions relevant for determining relative prices  to play  a role  in 
influencing the  behavior of  exchange rates.  Consistent with  the  observed 
facts,  however,  the model  should not  insist that nominal or real exchange 
rates adjust rapidly to eliminate current account imbalances. 
The theoretical model of  exchange rate  determination developed in this 
paper possesses these desirable properties. This model  is a compendium of 
monetary and real models of  exchange rate behavior, with equilibrium and 
disequilibrium features, that have been  integrated into a unified  theoretical 
framework  in  which  the  exchange  rate  is  treated  as  an  asset  price.  The 
model incorporates a simple, reduced-form condition of  money market equi- 
librium that  is consistent with  a very general specification of  the structural 
factors  influencing money  demand,  including wealth  and  income  effects, 
currency substitution effects,  and  the possibility of  a risk  premium  in the 
foreign exchange market that affects the demand for money by  influencing 
nominal  interest rates.  Under  the  assumption of  rational expectations,  the 
condition of money market equilibrium implies an asset price expression for 
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pected  future differences between  (the logarithms of)  the domestic money 
supply and the exogenous (to the monetary sector of  the economy) compo- 
nent of the demand for domestic money. 
The model  of  exchange rate  determination developed in this paper also 
incorporates  a  theory  of  the  determination of  the  real  exchange  rate  by 
means of  a general equilibrium specification of  the condition of  balance of 
payments equilibrium. This specification is consistent with the standard two- 
country, two-commodity model of the real theory of international trade, with 
the  dependent  economy  model  in  which  the  home  country produces and 
consumes its own nontraded good as well as a traded good that is a perfect 
substitute for goods produced and  consumed in the rest of  the world,  and 
with the usual “Keynesian”  model in which the home country produces an 
output that is distinct from the output of the rest of  the world. An important 
feature of  this model of  balance of  payments  equilibrium is that  both  the 
level  and  the  expected  rate  of  change  of  the  real  exchange  rate  affect 
the desired difference between domestic spending and domestic income and 
the current account balance. Under the assumption of  rational expectations, 
it  follows that  (the logarithm of)  the real  exchange rate that  is consistent 
with balance of  payments equilibrium (but not necessarily with a zero cur- 
rent  account balance) depends on  the  long-run equilibrium real  exchange 
rate  and on  the divergence between  the actual level of  net  foreign assets 
held by domestic residents and the long-run desired level of such asset hold- 
ings. The dependence of  the real exchange rate on  the level of  net  foreign 
assets is consistent with  the relationship described in  a number of  recent 
models  of  the  dynamic  interaction between  the  current  account  and  the 
exchange rate.  The  asset price property of  the  exchange rate  is reflected 
in formulas expressing the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate and the 
long-run desired level of  net foreign assets as discounted sums of  expected 
future values of the exogenous factors affecting excess demands for domestic 
and foreign goods (and hence the trade balance) and  the desired  level  of 
domestic spending. 
In the equilibrium version  of  the model of  exchange rate determination 
developed in this paper, money is strongly neutral and the real sector of the 
economic system functions independently of the monetary sector. For this 
reason, real  economic conditions affecting the  real  exchange rate  and the 
demand for real money balances can be taken as exogenous with respect to 
the monetary sector of the economic system, and the reduced-form condition 
for money market equilibrium may be treated as the proximate determinant 
of  the nominal exchange rate,  as is done in most simple monetary models 
of exchange rate behavior. An alternative (but analytically equivalent) solu- 
tion for the equilibrium nominal exchange rate brings the influence of  real 
economic conditions on the exchange rate into sharper focus. Real economic 
conditions influence the equilibrium nominal exchange rate because they af- 
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monetary  element  that  influences  the  behavior  of  all  domestic  nominal 
prices. Real economic conditions also influence the equilibrium nominal ex- 
change  rate  by  affecting  the  equilibrium  real  exchange rate.  Specifically, 
with the general level of domestic prices determined by the requirements of 
monetary  equilibrium,  an  increase  in  the  equilibrium  relative price  of  do- 
mestic  goods  must  be  accomplished  by  an  alteration  of  the  nominal  ex- 
change rate which allows the domestic price of foreign goods to fall and the 
domestic price  of domestic  goods to rise.  In the equilibrium  model of  ex- 
change rate determination,  such movements of the nominal exchange rate in 
response  to movements  in  the  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate  provide  the 
only explanation for deviations from purchasing power parity. 
In the disequilibrium version of the model of exchange rate determination 
developed  in  this  paper,  money  is  not  neutral  and  monetary  disturbances 
have  temporary  disequilibrium  effects  on  real  output, relative  prices,  the 
balance of payments, and real  and  nominal  exchange  rates.  The source of 
monetary  nonneutrality  is the assumption that the domestic money price of 
domestic  goods does not  adjust  immediately  to its  equilibrium  value,  but 
instead is governed by an adjustment rule that allows for expected changes 
in  the  equilibrium  price  of  domestic  goods and for gradual  elimination  of 
the existing  divergence  between  the actual and equilibrium prices  of these 
goods. The extent of this divergence determines the extent of disequilibrium 
in the economy, and the divergences of all endogenous variables from their 
respective equilibrium  values are proportional to this measure of the extent 
of disequilibrium.  Expected elimination of disequilibrium through expected 
convergence  of  the  price  of  domestic  goods  toward  its  equilibrium  value 
contributes an additional term to the expressions from the equilibrium model 
for  expected  changes in  endogenous  variables,  including  the  nominal  and 
real exchange rates.  Unexpected changes in the equilibrium price of domes- 
tic goods constitute the innovations to  disequilibrium  in the economy, and 
the spillover effects of these innovations contribute an additional term to the 
expressions  for unexpected  changes in endogenous variables,  including the 
nominal and real exchange rate.  In particular,  provided that the response of 
money demand to innovations in disequilibrium is not too strong, it is likely 
that a monetary disturbance that causes an unexpected increase in  the equi- 
librium values of all domestic money prices will induce a more than propor- 
tionate  response  of  the  actual  nominal  exchange  rate  due to  the  spillover 
effect of the innovation to disequilibrium; that is, the nominal exchange rate 
will  “overshoot”  in  response  to monetary  disturbances.  Correspondingly, 
the real exchange rate will respond to the disequilibrium effect of a mone- 
tary disturbance,  even though  such a disturbance has no effect on the equi- 
librium real exchange rate.  This effect of a monetary disturbance on the real 
exchange  rate, however,  will  be temporary  because  the price  of  domestic 
goods will gradually adjust toward its equilibrium value and the disequilib- 
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contrast,  a  real  disturbance  that  permanently  alters  equilibrium  relative 
prices  will permanently  affect the real  exchange rate,  and this  long-run  ef- 
fect may be greater than the short-run effect of the real disturbance because 
the disequilibrium  spillover effect of  such disturbances  is likely  to work  in 
the opposite direction of their long-run effect. 
The results of this paper can be extended in a number of directions.  One 
direction for such extensions is simply to apply the analytical results of the 
present  paper to the examination  of specific issues concerning the behavior 
of exchange rates and their relationships with other economic variables. For 
instance,  we could  investigate  the effects of economic  growth, of  changes 
in desired spending patterns, of changes in government fiscal or commercial 
policy, and of a host of other economic changes on the behavior of real and 
nominal  exchange  rates  and  on  the  relationships  among  exchange  rates, 
prices,  interest rates, and the balance  of payments,  in both  an equilibrium 
and a disequilibrium  setting. The general procedure for conducting such in- 
vestigations is to specify the nature of the initiating economic disturbance in 
terms of its effects on  the paths  of  the  exogenous  forcing variables of the 
model,  and then to examine the effects of these changes in  the paths of the 
forcing  variables  on  the  paths  of  the  endogenous  variables  of  the  model, 
including  real  and  nominal  exchange rates,  prices,  interest  rates,  and  the 
balance of payments.  Care must be taken in conducting these investigations 
because,  in general, an initiating economic disturbance will affect the paths 
of  all of the exogenous forcing variables. For example, economic growth in 
domestic  goods  sector  of  the  home  country  will  affect  the  demand  shift 
parameter  that  is  important  for determining  the  relative  price of  domestic 
goods (the z’s).  It will also affect the exogenous monetary  factor (the w’s) 
by affecting the real demand  for domestic  money; and as domestic income 
grows there is also likely to be an effect of the target  level of  domestic net 
holdings of  foreign assets (represented by  an increasing level of a). 
Another direction  for possible extensions of the analysis of this paper is 
by  modifying  some of  the  assumptions  of  the  model  without  altering  its 
basic  character. One such  modification  would  be  to allow explicitly  for  a 
domestic, nontradable asset (other than domestic money) that is not regarded 
as a perfect substitute for either domestic  money or foreign assets.42 If  the 
demand for this asset were a function only of  variables that already appear 
in the model,  its introduction would not require any alteration of the formal 
results  of  the  present  analysis.  All  that  would  happen  is  that  the  rate  of 
return on this asset would be determined by the requirement that the demand 
to hold it should equal the supply available to be held. Explicit introduction 
of  such  a  domestic  asset,  however,  would  allow  explicit  analysis  of  the 
effects of economic disturbances on its rate of return and of changes in the 
42. Models that  employ this type of  specification of  the structure of  the asset markets have 
been investigated by Dornbusch (1975) and Branson (1976). 58  Michael Mussa 
supply of  this asset (resulting perhaps from open market operations) on the 
exchange rate  and  other  variables.  A  more  ambitious modification of  the 
assumptions of the present model would be to allow for tradable domestic 
assets that are not regarded as perfect substitutes for foreign assets by  either 
home  or  foreign  residents.  This  modification  would  require  alteration of 
some of  the formal results of  the present paper.  It  would permit  explicit 
treatment of  issues that  arise in portfolio balance  models of  the exchange 
rate that assume a multiplicity of  tradable securities. Yet  another modifica- 
tion of  the present model that is worthy of  consideration is its extension to 
a two-country world in which events in the home country have a measurable 
effect events  in the  foreign country.  This modification would also require 
alteration of some of the formal results of the present paper. It would permit 
analysis of  issues relating to the dynamic interaction between  large econ- 
omie~.~~ 
A final direction for possible extension of the present paper is to examine 
the microeconomic foundations of  the economic relationships that are em- 
ployed in the present model. This direction has been taken in several recent 
papers that have explored the implications for exchange rate theory of  dif- 
ferent  specification of  the  microeconomic foundations of  the  demand  for 
money and of the demands for interest-bearing securities.4  For these efforts 
to bear fruit,  however, they must yield behavior functions whose implica- 
tions  for the  behavior of  exchange rates  and  other variables are  at  least 
broadly consistent with the observed empirical regularities. 
Comment  Jacob A. Frenkel 
Recent years have witnessed significant advances in theoretical and empiri- 
cal research on exchange rate determination. One of  the important charac- 
teristics of the modem approach is that the exchange rate is being viewed as 
a  financial  variable  that  is  determined  in  general  equilibrium within  the 
macroeconomic setting and, like many other financial variables, its current 
value is strongly influenced by  expectations concerning future policies and 
events.  Characteristically,  Mussa’s paper  on  the  theory  of  exchange rate 
determination is comprehensive and perceptive. He starts with a brief outline 
of  empirical  regularities  which  have  characterized the  regime of  flexible 
rates and presents an outline of  the asset market view of  exchange rate de- 
termination which is consistent with the empirical regularities. He then pre- 
sents and evaluates various monetary models of exchange rate determination 
43.  A  limited  amount of  work  has been  done on genuine multicountry models of exchange 
44. See, for  example,  Krugman  (1980),  Helpman  (1981),  Kareken  and  Wallace  (1981). 
rates determination in recent  years; see, for instance, Bhandari (1982) and Saidi (1982). 
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and proceeds to develop the relationship between balance of payments equi- 
librium and the exchange rate as well  as the interaction between  real  and 
monetary factors in effecting the equilibrium exchange rate. The paper con- 
cludes with an analysis of  sticky prices and disequilibrium dynamics. 
My  remarks will touch on several points in the paper and then will raise 
some unresolved issues. But in order to appreciate the extent of development 
in the theory of  exchange rates, I should like to note questions that are not 
central to the paper and which probably would have been key questions in 
the early 1970s. For example, we do not expect any more flexible exchange 
rates to eliminate current account imbalances and we  do not  wonder why 
changes in exchange rates have not done so. Likewise, we  no longer expect 
a unique relationship between exchange rates (nominal or real) and the cur- 
rent account since it is now obvious (as it should have been since the devel- 
opment of  the absorption  approach) that  the effect of  changes in  relative 
prices on the current account depends on the effects of  these changes on 
income as well as on spending, and that without additional assumptions and 
information on the source of the change in relative prices, on the composi- 
tion of  spending, on the perceived permanence of the change in prices, and 
the like, there can be no general presumption concerning the overall effect 
on the excess of  income over spending. 
The Monetary Models 
Mussa discusses two classes of  monetary  models. The first, which  was 
used  in the early developments of the monetary approach to the exchange 
rate and has been applied to many empirical studies, expresses the exchange 
rate in terms of the supplies of  domestic and foreign nominal balances and 
the demands for domestic and foreign real balances. Mussa notes correctly 
that the validity of  the monetary approach does not depend on the assump- 
tion of  purchasing power parity since the model can allow for divergences 
from  parity.  However,  in  empirical  research  allowances for  divergences 
from  panties  and  for a slow adjustment in the money  market  need  to be 
introduced with great care. For example, one may not introduce these con- 
siderations into the final exchange rate equation by  adding a lagged depen- 
dent variable. They need to be incorporated directly into the equations that 
summarize the  more  fundamental relationships (like  the  money  markets, 
etc.). This  procedure implies that  the  properties of  the error term  in the 
exchange rate equation may not be specified arbitrarily without reference to 
the properties of  the error terms in the underlying relationships. 
Mussa believes that the two major difficulties with  the simple monetary 
models  are (1) they  have not  performed well  in explaining movements  in 
nominal exchange rates and (2)  they do not reveal explicitly the critical role 
of  expectations.  While  I  agree  with  both  of  these points,  I  believe  they 
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explaining short-term exchange rate movements is not specific to the mone- 
tary model of exchange rate determination.  Rather,  it has been a character- 
istic of virtually  all simple structural models including the various varieties 
of the  monetary  models, the portfolio  balance models, the current  account 
models, and others. The key reason for the poor performance of the various 
models  is the  intrinsic characteristics  of exchange rates as asset  prices.  As 
Mussa  emphasizes, exchange rates  are very  sensitive to expectations  con- 
cerning  future  events and policies.  Periods  that  are dominated  by  rumors, 
announcements,  and “news”  which alter expectations are likely to induce a 
relatively  large  degree  of  exchange  rate  volatility.  Since  by  definition 
“news”  cannot be predicted on the basis of past information, it follows that 
by  and  large the resulting  fluctuations of exchange rates are unpredictable. 
In a way, this asset market perspective  suggests that we should not expect 
to be able to forecast exchange rate changes accurately with the  aid of the 
simple structural models.  The role of  the simple structural models is to ac- 
count for the systematic component of the evolution of exchange rates. Sec- 
ond, while there is no doubt that expectations should be central in modeling 
exchange rate behavior,  it is relevant to note that the monetary  models (as 
well  as many  other models)  have  incorporated  forward-looking  variables, 
like the rates of interest and/or the forward exchange rate, among the deter- 
minants  of  the  spot exchange rate.  As such, these  models do provide  for 
channels through  which  expectations  about the future influence current val- 
ues.  Mussa  is justified,  however,  in  noting  that  the  specific  link  between 
expectations  concerning  the future  and  the  current  value  of  the  exchange 
rate should be consistent with the general principles which govern the pric- 
ing formulas for durable assets that are traded  in organized markets. 
Mussa  concludes  his  insightful  discussion  of  the  monetary  models  by 
pointing out two conceptual difficulties in exchange rate modeling. First, the 
assumption  that in forming expectations  about the future money supply in- 
dividuals use primarily their knowledge of the stochastic process generating 
the money supply may be inadequate.  Rather,  Mussa indicates that in form- 
ing expectations  about the future money supply, it is likely that individuals 
use diverse  sources of information other than the easily measured variables 
and, specifically, other than  the observed money supply series. The second 
difficulty is the lack of adequate measures of the exogenous factors affecting 
the demand  and  the  supply, and of  expectations concerning  the future be- 
havior of these factors.  It should be emphasized,  however, that these diffi- 
culties  do not  pertain  only  to  the  monetary  models  of  exchange  rates. 
Rather,  they are sufficiently general to be applicable to practically all avail- 
able models of exchange rate determination. 
The Balance of Payments 
Mussa’s analysis of the relation  between the balance of payments and the 
exchange rates contains  a novel  exposition of the  fundamental equivalence 61 
between the “absorption”  and “elasticity”  approaches to the analysis of the 
trade balance.  Mussa  demonstrates how  the current account of the balance 
of  payments may  have a  “real”  interpretation  as a net  flow of  real goods 
and  services  and  a  “financial”  interpretation  as  a  net  flow  of  financial 
assets.  But, most  important, he shows that even though  the model  may be 
rather complex, its reduced-form  exchange rate equation  looks formally the 
same as the reduced-form  equation  of  much  simpler  models.  Analytically, 
the key  difference between the various  reduced-form  equations  lies  in  the 
determinants of D‘-the  variable measuring expectations. 
One of  the significant  implications  of  Mussa’s  analysis  is that  one may 
not validly criticize or praise a model just on the basis of  its formal reduced- 
form equation. This implication  follows from the fact that the various mod- 
els can be solved so as to yield almost indistinguishable reduced-form  equa- 
tions. It is pertinent to note, however, that even though the exact expression 
of the reduced-form equation may  be  based  on analytical  and  expository 
convenience, the interpretation of empirical reduced-form estimates must re- 
flect the details of the underlying  structural model. 
The Theory of  Exchange Rate Determination 
Modeling Disequilibrium 
Mussa concludes his paper with  an analysis of sticky prices and disequi- 
librium dynamics. Disequilibrium  arises whenever the predetermined  value 
of  the price of  domestic goods differs from its conditional equilibrium value. 
However, for Mussa “disequilibrium”  is nor  a situation in which anything 
can happen, the basic  laws of  economics cease to apply, and handwaving 
replaces  economic theory  as the tools of analysis.  Mussa’s  concept  of  dis- 
equilibrium is much more attractive. It imposes structure and discipline on the 
art of  modeling.  Thus, when there is disequilibrium in the market for domes- 
tic goods, it  “is necessary  to specify how this disequilibrium  is accommo- 
dated  by  the agents that participate  in  the market  for domestic goods and 
also to examine how the disequilibrium  in this market affects conditions  in 
other markets.”  This modeling strategy is commendable in that it forces into 
the open the key microeconomic  reasons which underlie the macroeconomic 
manifestation  of  apparent disequilibria.  Further,  in the context of  exchange 
rate analysis the disequilibrium modeling provides for the mechanism which 
eliminates gradually divergences from purchasing power parities. 
Additional Issues in Exchange Rate Modeling 
To the fundamental issues  discussed  in  Mussa’s  paper, I would  like to 
add three more issues that are critical for  empirical  research  in the area of 
exchange rate determination and which raise some difficulties that have not 
yet been resolved. The first issue may be referred to as the “peso problem.” 
This phrase originally  characterized  the  situation  with  the Mexican  peso, 
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had been expected for several years, the peso was traded  at a forward dis- 
count in the market  for foreign exchange. Obviously, as long as the deval- 
uation  did  not  occur, the forward exchange rate  proved  (ex  post)  to have 
been  a biased  forecast of  the realized  future spot exchange rate. But once 
the devaluation  took  place,  it exceeded the prediction  that was implied  by 
the forward discount on the peso. 
Generally, the peso problem may be viewed as a situation in which there 
are many observations but  only few events. In  Mexico’s  case, there  were 
many days (observations) during which the forward  discount  prevailed  and 
yet only  one event-the  devaluation itself.  These circumstances  raise  con- 
ceptual  and  practical  difficulties  for studies  which  attempt to examine the 
efficiency of  foreign  exchange markets  and the bias of  forecasts  of  future 
spot rates based on lagged forward rates. Likewise  in such circumstances  it 
is  not  clear  whether  a  rise  in  the  number  of  observations in  any  sample 
which is being brought about by a larger frequency of measurements  should 
be treated as a corresponding increase in the number of effective degrees of 
freedom.  In  a  way  the peso  problem  could  be  cast in  terms  of  a  small- 
samples problem  which has much wider application.  However, because the 
foreign  exchange market  is  strongly  influenced  by  expectations  of  future 
events and  of  future  policies,  and  because  current  expectations  of  future 
change in  policies  (like a devaluation or a  specific change in  intervention 
policies) are based on probabilistic  evaluations, it seems that the peso prob- 
lem is especially relevant  in the foreign exchange market. 
The second issue relates to the role of innovations.  The anticipatory  role 
of  exchange rates  suggests that  empirical  research  of  exchange rate  deter- 
mination  should  relate  changes in exchange rates  to the innovations in the 
relevant  regressors.  Because  the innovations are intrinsically  unobservable, 
any empirical  analysis  involves the joint examination  of the model  as well 
as the measurement of the innovation (i.e., the measurement of  the expected 
values which are used in the construction of  the innovations).  Since there is 
no practical way to avoid the joint-hypotheses problem completely, it seems 
that inference from empirical estimates should be made with great care. 
A third difficulty also relates to the anticipatory nature of exchange rates 
and the prompt response of asset prices to new information. It concerns the 
implications  of  different  frequencies  of  data  collection  for  various  time 
series.  For example, data on exchange and interest rates are available  in a 
much greater  frequency than data on national income or on the current  ac- 
count. These different frequencies of data availability are reflected in differ- 
ent patterns  of  revisions  of  expectations and may  have a systematic  effect 
on the time series characteristics  of  the innovations of the various data. 
These  issues  and  others-like  the  treatment  and  identification  of  risk 
premia,  the proper definition of money, the specification of  the demand for 
money  in an open economy, the relative degree of  substitution among var- 
ious assets, and the role of  portfolio  balance  in affecting exchange rates- 
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Comment  Rudiger Dornbusch 
Mussa’s paper offers a definitive, comprehensive view of  the asset market 
model of  exchange rate  determination.  It  is  a restatement of  the develop- 
ments in exchange rate economics of the  1970s to which Mussa himself has 
been an important contributor. The task of his paper is to be integrative, not 
a border raid into the unknown or a broad questioning of  received wisdom. 
As  Mussa states the objective of  his enquiry,  “it  assists in explaining why 
expected changes in exchange rates should generally be  small and why ac- 
tual exchange rate changes should be dominated by the random, unexpected 
component of  exchange rate changes.” 
Mussa’s paper gives us  an  excellent statement of  established principles 
but  unfortunately is  not  much  help  in explaining the  large persistent real 
exchange rate movements that are at the center of  policy debate. Nor does 
it offer any advice on exchange rate policy. 
Real Interest Rates and the Real Exchange Rate 
While the basic model that Mussa develops is familiar there are also new 
ideas well worth stressing. One of  these is the definition of the real interest 
rate  appropriate to an open economy macroeconomic model. Mussa notes 
that  the  relevant real  interest rate,  from consumers’ point  of  view,  is  the 
nominal rate adjusted by  the rate of  inflation of  the consumer price index. 
With i, and  (e + p*) the rates of  inflation in home currency of  domestic 
and imported goods, the real rate of  interest then becomes 
(1)  r  i -  ad  -  (1 - a)(e + p*) 
= i -  i, + (1 -  a)(f) -  e -  p*,, 
where a is the consumption share of  domestic goods. But the equation can 
also be  written  in terms of  the rate of  producer price  inflation, 6, and the 
rate of change of the terms of trade. 
Thus there is  a link between real interest rates and the rate of  change of 
the real exchange rate.  Mussa rightly notes that  terms  of  trade effects on 
real interest rates are an  important part of the trade balance adjustment pro- 
cess.  This  point  emerges  particularly  when  structural  change  over  time 
affects  both  incomes and  relative prices.  Permanent  income or .life-cycle 
consumption patterns would lead us to predict that changes in full employ- 
ment output would lead to increased current consumption, whatever the tim- 
ing of  the income growth.  But the timing is important for the structure of 
relative prices over time and thus for real interest rates and consumption. A 
transitory  increase in output today  would tend  to deteriorate today’s terms 
of trade and thus increase real interest rates, other things equal. The same 
output change occurring tomorrow  would  imply  a fall  in  the  real  interest 64  Michael Mussa 
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rate. In bringing these real interest rate effects into an exchange rate and macro- 
economic setting,  Mussa raises an  important issue for further modeling of 
intertemporal exchange rate models. There is a parallel effort underway  in 
barter models of trade that already offers interesting results. ’ 
‘\’  Real exchange  rate-  -  Interest  differential 
I  I  I  ,  80 
The Real Exchange Rate Problem 
The  accompanying  figure  l.C.l shows the  real  exchange rate  for  the 
United States dollar as measured by  the value-added deflator in manufactur- 
ing. The extraordinary fact, of  course, is that the fluctuations of  the dollar 
in  real terms have been so large. From  1979 to  1982 there has been a real 
appreciation in  excess of  25%  and  in  1982 the real dollar was  more than 
10% above its average for the 1971-81  period. Now the striking fact is that 
these  real  exchange  rate  changes are presumably the  by-product  of  asset 
market  disturbances-tight  money  and  expectations  about  the  course  of 
money and fiscal policy-not  changes in full employment equilibrium real 
exchange rates.  The magnitude of  rate movements suggests that there may 
be  a real  exchange rate  “problem”  that  calls for policy  intervention. The 
trouble is that  we  would need  models that  identify the source of  the real 
exchange rate change before we could confidently predict the cure. Assert- 
ing that exchange rates are too flexible-along  with asset prices, and unlike 
goods prices and wages-is  merely a guess, though probably a correct one. 
Fig. l.C.l 
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The discomfort goes further. As the figure shows, there has been over the 
last year an  interest differential favoring the  United  States. Theory would 
predict that a tightening of  money in  the United States would raise United 
States interest rates (in the short run), lead to an  appreciation of  the spot 
exchange rate, with overshooting, but would then be followed by  a rate of 
depreciation matching the interest differential. But the dollar has not  been 
depreciating. On the contrary, there has been surprising stability in the face 
of  what  is  broadly  considered overvaluation.  Mussa’s paper  is  not  at  all 
inconsistent with  such observations. After all it  is  spelled out in  sufficient 
generality so that the right expectations can generate any path  of  nominal 
and real exchange rates.  But the challenge of  the evidence is to develop a 
more specific hypothesis about how markets are working and how  overval- 
uation can be sustained. 
Traps and Trips 
One direction that I find particularly fruitful is suggested by  Blanchard 
(1979) in his discussion of  asset market bubbles. Blanchard notes that risk- 
averse speculators are willing to hold an asset known to be overvalued pro- 
vided  the  expected  losses  associated with  a collapse to  fundamentals are 
offset by  sufficient anticipated appreciation. Let e, and  2,  be the actual rate 
and the fundamental rate and x the probability of the fundamental rate pre- 
vailing in the next period. Then the arbitrage relation is 
(2) 
Suppose the fundamentals rate is constant and equal to 7. Then (2)  shows 
that  the  home  currency  could  be  appreciating  despite  the  fact  that  it  is 
overvalued. In  fact it is precisely because it is overvalued that it must, with 
a sufficient probability, be expected to appreciate further so that asset hold- 
ers would be willing  to carry the hot potato. This type of  equilibrium is a 
very  uncomfortable one because  it implies that for some period real  asset 
prices can be carried far away from the equilibrium levels appropriate in the 
goods markets. Speculation in asset markets prevails over fundamentals until 
some random event carries prices back to fundamentals. Note that  (2)  im- 
plies the  possibility of  a speculative trap.  With  an  interest  differential in 
favor of  the home currency there is overvaluation that  is larger the larger 
the interest differential and the smaller the risk of  a collapse to fundamen- 
tals. 
Models of  exchange rate  dynamics in  the  1970s have  stressed rational 
expectations and the perfect working of  markets, mitigated by  differential 
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finance theory now  suggests that claims for asset market efficiency may be 
overrated.  Shiller (1981), for example,  argues that  asset  prices  are more 
volatile than is warranted by the underlying fundamentals variability. In the 
same vein,  it is shown that for particular structures of expectational errors it 
is in practice impossible to tell whether errors are persistent or white noise. 
Suppose, for example, a simple monetary model, 
(3)  m, - e, =  -U(E,+~ -  el), 
and a money supply process, 
(4)  mlfl = pm, + 4, 
where t,,]  is the current expectation of  the exchange rate next period and 
u, is a white noise process.  Under rational expectations the solution for the 
exchange rate is given by 
(5)  el = xm,; x = 1/[1 + a(l - p)]. 
But  suppose  instead that  the  public  entertained the  wrong  exchange rate 
model, specifically, 
(6) 
Thus an irrelevant variable,  el, is introduced into the forecasts.  If (6) is the 
expectations model, the equilibrium exchange rate is 
(5') 
t,+,  = xm,+l + ve,; v 2  0. 
(I + a)x 
e,  = 
1  + a(1 - v)mr, 
It is readily verified that forecast errors e,+  = e,,  I  - t,, now are serially 
correlated: 
(7) 
(1 + a)x 
1  + a(1 - v) 
4.  e1+1 = Pef  + 
But note the capital point. If  there is very little autocorrelation in money, so 
that  p  is  close to  zero,  then  autocorrelation in forecast errors will  not  be 
easy  to detect.  In  fact with  conventional samples the  hypothesis of  white 
noise cannot be rejected and thus economic agents will not uncover that they 
use the wrong  model  and make systematic errors.  But  these errors are of 
consequence. One of the implications, for instance, is excess variance in the 
actual exchange rate. The example here is simplistic, of  course, but it sug- 
gests that modeling exchange rate models including plausible, irrelevant var- 
iables may  well  be an avenue toward  explaining two facts: one, the large 
movements  of  exchange  rates  seemingly unrelated  to  fundamentals,  and, 
two, the failure of  any particular structural model to account for the experi- 
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Comment  Pentti J. K. Kouri 
With hindsight I have come to feel that there was an unnecessary  overshoot- 
ing in exchange rate theory in  the past ten years. This is particularly true of 
the extreme form of the monetary approach. As a partial equilibrium theory, 
the “old  textbook model”  of exchange rate determination,  as formulated by 
Tsiang  in  particular,  gave a  basically  correct  description  of  the  way  the 
foreign exchange market  works.  It also identified most of the key variables 
that explain exchange rate fluctuations. Although the exchange rate is a rel- 
ative price  of  the  monies  by  definition,  it is vacuous to  say that  “the  ex- 
change rate  is determined  by  the relative  supplies of  and  demands for the 
two monies.” 
Demand for foreign currency  in the foreign exchange market  is demand 
to spend  foreign  money on foreign goods and  services,  not to hold  it over 
any extended period  of time. As an empirical fact individuals and firms do 
not hold  significant transactions  balances  in  foreign  currencies.  Only com- 
mercial banks need to hold small working balances in their capacity as mar- 
ket  makers.  In  advanced  countries  virtually  no  domestic  transactions  are 
paid  for in foreign currency.  What we have is a world of  national  monies. 
As  McKinnon  has emphasized, the key  function of foreign exchange mar- 
kets is to make each national  money international money as well. If  foreign 
exchange markets are efficiently organized, a system of  convertible national 
monies can achieve many of the benefits of a truly global monetary system 
based  on one world  money, while  still retaining national  sovereignty over 
the  creation  of  money.  One may  question  whether  an  international  rather 
than a global  monetary  system is desirable or even  viable in  the long run, 
but it certainly is a correct description of the past as well as of the present. 
For the future, one key factor in determining the viability of  any system is 
bank  regulation.  If  financial  institutions  were  allowed  to  create  a  global 
means  of  payments,  modem  information  and  communications  technology 
would certainly  make it possible.  We could have a world of global monies 
cutting across national boundaries. 
But  we  do not  have  such  a  system  yet.  As we  trade  between  different 
countries we have to go through the foreign exchange market, and therefore 
all payment flows between countries that belong to different currency areas 
are  registered  as supplies  and  demands in  the  foreign  exchange  market. 
Accordingly,  it  is both  natural  and  correct  to  think  of  equilibrium  in  the 
foreign exchange market as a balance between such payment flows. 
Now,  if  there  are no capital  movements  because  of  government  regula- 
tion, for example, and  if  we  abstract  from  small changes  in working  bal- 
ances, equilibrium  in  the foreign  exchange  market obtains  when  the trade 
balance  is  zero. This gives  us  the  Bicherdicke-Robinson-Machlup  supply- 
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the simple textbook  model  fails to explain the foreign exchange market be- 
cause it does not incorporate speculation and capital movements. Once these 
features are brought  in, the foreign exchange market begins to look  like all 
speculative markets, responding  immediately  to all  new  information  about 
the fundamentals. In his classic article, Milton Friedman argued that specu- 
lators would stabilize the exchange rate against reversible changes in supply 
and  demand.  This argument  was  simple and  persuasive:  speculators  can 
make  money  and  therefore  survive only  if  they  on  average buy  foreign 
exchange when the price is low and sell it when the price is high. Therefore, 
speculative activity must be stabilizing. 
Friedman’s paper  prompted  several  authors,  among  them  Baumol  and 
Kemp, to come forward  with counterexamples of destabilizing  and profita- 
ble speculation. Baumol provided an example in which speculators sold after 
the exchange rate peaked  and bought  after it bottomed out. He was able to 
show, in the context of  a simple dynamic model, that  speculators  who fol- 
lowed such a trading rule could still make money and, for certain parameter 
values, increase the amplitude of  exchange rate  fluctuations or even  make 
the fluctuations  explosive. Kemp provided  another example in  which  there 
were  multiple  equilibria  and  demonstrated  that  speculators  could  push  the 
market from one equilibrium  to another and yet make money. The problem 
with  these  counterexamples is  that  they  rely  on ad hoc  specifications  of 
trading  rules  and do not allow for forward-looking  behavior  on the part of 
speculators. It was only  later that  Stanley  Black  (1973) introduced  Muth’s 
notion of rational  expectations in the foreign exchange market and brought 
the analysis of speculation on a firmer analytical ground. 
If  the critics  of  Friedman were  too  eager to  construct  ad  hoc  counter- 
examples, the advocates of flexible exchange rates were too ready  to con- 
clude that  the exchange rate  would be quite stable under flexible exchange 
rates.  The following  quote from Machlup is  typical  of  the  views  held  by 
early advocates of  flexible exchange rates: “Under a system of  greater flex- 
ibility  such serious disalignments of exchange rates would never, or hardly 
ever, arise, . . . . Profits from small changes can be only small, inviting 
only  moderate  speculation,  which  can  be  easily  discouraged,  if  this  is 
wanted,  by  relatively  minor differentials  in  interest  rates. ” Against  these 
prior expectations, the volatility of  exchange rates in recent years appeared 
to be a surprise. It has  suggested  to some that  speculation  may  indeed be 
destabilizing. There is, however, an important point that was missed in the 
early  discussion:  the  distinction  between  ex  ante  changes  and  ex  post 
changes.  Speculation can  stabilize  the exchange rate  only  in  the  ex  ante 
sense that it eliminates all predictable future changes in the exchange rate in 
excess of differences in  domestic and foreign interest rates.  But it does not 
stabilize  the exchange rate ex post  when  the market  is subject to  a steady 
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A parallel  development  in the literature of the  1950s and  1960s was the 
work  on  the  theory  of  spot  and  forward  markets.  In  a remarkable  paper, 
S. C. Tsiang (1959) developed a “systematic  reformulation of the theory of 
forward  exchange.”  As Tsiang  notes,  previous  work  (e.g., by  Keynes) on 
the  forward  market  had  been  mostly concerned  with  covered  interest  arbi- 
trage and the interest rate parity  equation.  Although  the role of  speculation 
and trade hedging had been recognized,  no systematic theory existed which 
would explain  “precisely  how  the  interplay of  all these  different  types  of 
operation jointly determine the forward exchange rate and how the forward 
exchange market  is  linked  to the  spot exchange  market.”  This is  exactly 
what  Tsiang’s paper  does  exhaustively,  leaving  few  relevant  issues  un- 
touched.  Stanley Black’s important contribution in 1973 provided the finish- 
ing touches  to a fully  worked  out model  of  the  foreign exchange  market, 
quite adequate to explain the behavior of exchange rates since then in terms 
of fundamentals  and the intrinsic dynamics of  the market. The partial equi- 
librium model  did not imply PPP, nor did it  rule  out the possibility of ex- 
change rate instability in an unstable environment. The literature of the past 
ten years largely neglected this earlier work on the foreign exchange market, 
in part because it followed the wave of the monetary approach in balance of 
payments theory. 
The  Chicago  monetarist  approach,  represented  by  Jacob  Frenkel  and 
Michael  Mussa,  went  furthest  in  throwing  away  the  balance  of  payments 
framework. With the assumption of PPP, perfect capital mobility and instan- 
taneous price flexibility import and export schedules or preferences between 
domestic and foreign assets no longer played a role in explaining exchange 
rate  fluctuations.  In  effect, the  monetarist  model  is  not  really  a  model  of 
exchange rate determination.  Rather it was a Cagan-Sargent-Wallace  model 
of  price level determination,  in which exchange rates were determined sim- 
ply  as ratios  of price  levels.  The monetarist model  has failed so clearly as 
an empirically relevant theory that I need not discuss it further. 
My own work on exchange rate theory in  1974 grew out of my work on 
capital movements with Michael Porter and Victor Argy at the International 
Monetary  Fund.  It occurred  to me that  the  Kouri-Porter  model  would  be- 
come a  model  of  exchange rate  determination  if  the  stock  of  net  foreign 
assets were exogenous  and the exchange rate became endogenous  with  the 
domestic  interest  rate  instead.  Indeed  the  model  could  represent  any  ex- 
change rate system-for  example, Williamson’s crawling peg-with  appro- 
priate  specification  of  central  bank  behavior  in  the  foreign  exchange  and 
domestic bond markets.  Converting the KP model into a model of short-run 
exchange rate determination  was straightforward,  but it was not enough. It 
was necessary to explain the evolution of the exchange rate and asset stocks 
over time and also the dynamics of expectations formation. 
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simple if  it is not confined to its narrow purpose.  I  assumed a small open 
economy producing only traded goods,  so that the trade account could  be 
explained simply as a difference between domestic output and  absorption. 
Domestic price level would be determined by world prices and the exchange 
rate; domestic wage rate  could be  fixed  or flexible. On  the  asset  side,  I 
stripped the  KP  model to  its bare essentials, assuming that  there are only 
two assets: domestic money  and  foreign money. The allocation of  wealth 
between these two assets would depend on the expected rate of  change of 
the exchange rate.  This  is  the  channel through  which  speculation entered 
exchange rate determination. I assumed that foreigners do not hold domestic 
money. With these elements, the short-run model was complete: given the 
stock of  foreign assets and domestic money, the exchange rate would adjust 
in  such  a  way  that  existing  stocks would  be  willingly  held.  If  domestic 
residents wanted  to  get  out of  domestic money  into  foreign  money,  they 
could not collectively do sethey  would only drive up the price of  foreign 
money. The only way for the stock of  foreign assets to change in my  model 
was through current account surpluses or deficits. Depreciation of  the do- 
mestic currency would  reduce  domestic absorption and  produce  a  current 
account surplus: this  is  the  mechanism  through  which  the  desired capital 
transfer is effected over time. 
This simple model suggested looking at exchange rate determination and 
balance of  payments adjustment from  the viewpoint of  Tobin’s q theory. 
The  stock of  foreign assets is  like  a stock of  houses: it can  change only 
slowly through investment (current account surplus) or disinvestment (defi- 
cit).  But  its  valuation-xchange  rate-can  change  immediately.  In  the 
same way that an increase in q stimulates capital formation, currency depre- 
ciation stimulates accumulation of  foreign capital. Domestic currency is un- 
dervalued relative to its long-run equilibrium level when the stock of  foreign 
asset is below its long-run equilibrium level and overvalued when  the stock 
of  foreign assets is above its equilibrium level. 
In Kouri  (1976),  I developed this idea  in a model that  was too simple; 
other chapters of  my  dissertation introduce variations in the real exchange 
rate as well as in the real interest rate. The latter model is published in the 
Bigman-Taya volume  (Kouri,  1980). I  continue to  think  that  the  capital 
transfer perspective is a fruitful way  to look  at exchange rate behavior and 
balance of payments adjustment. It is rich enough to incorporate all relevant 
factors in a single unified framework. From the point of view of this model, 
the recent appreciation and continued strength of the dollar can be explained 
in  terms of  foreigners’ desire to  increase their holdings of  United  States 
assets,  in  part  because of  high  real  rates  of  return  and  in part  for other 
reasons such as shifts in long-term confidence in the United States vis-A-vis 
Europe. Marketable world wealth can be counted in trillions of dollars; even 
a small shift in asset preferences can lead to a capital transfer that  is  very 
large relative to what can be  effected through  the current account.  In the 71  The Theory of Exchange Rate Determination 
1970s, for example, the United States current account deficit never exceeded 
$15 billion. Even thejow of savings in the world, at close to $2,000 billion 
for the OECD countries  in  1982, is enormous relative to the feasible range 
of current account surpluses or deficits. 
The capital transfer problem has been one of the themes in my work with 
Jorge de Macedo.  In our joint paper (1978) we analyze the implications of 
differences in asset and consumption preferences. We also try to find micro- 
economic foundations for differences in asset preferences,  linking them with 
differences in consumption preferences. Jorge has continued this work in his 
own subsequent research. 
The second  concern  that  I  had  in  my  early  work  was  the modeling  of 
expectations.  In Kouri (1976) I considered alternative mechanisms of expec- 
tations formations,  including perfect foresight or rational expectations. Intro- 
duction of  perfect foresight in the portfolio balance model brought it closer 
and  closer to the  familiar  capital  models  and  their  well-known  problems 
of instability  and indeterminacy.  So  much has been said and written  about 
rational expectations that  I  need say no more. 
In  my early work  I  assumed price flexibility, not because I believed in it 
but in order to focus on the role of the exchange rate in balance of payments 
adjustment.  I could just as well have assumed that the central bank pegs the 
domestic price level, leaving the exchange rate to be determined by  supply 
and demand in the foreign exchange market (cf. Kouri  1983). In that paper 
I develop a dynamic partial equilibrium model of the foreign exchange mar- 
ket that does not restrict the macroeconomic framework. That paper focuses 
entirely  on the process  through  which the foreign exchange market adjusts 
to new stationary equilibrium following disturbances in the trade account or 
in the capital  account, assuming  exogenously  given  interest  rates, activity 
levels, and prices.  In more recent work 1 have gone further in modeling the 
workings of the foreign  exchange market with  careful specifications of the 
behavior of various actors in the market, following the lead of Tsiang, 1959 
(see my  paper  “Intertemporal  Balance  of  Payments  Equilibrium  and  Ex- 
change Rate Determination,”  unpublished  manuscript).  I believe there is a 
great deal more to be done along these lines toward a more detailed under- 
standing of the workings of the foreign exchange market. 
This brings me to another point.  In a world of instantaneous market clear- 
ing,  there  is  very  little  difference  between  alternative  exchange  rate 
regimes-putting  aside  well-known  monetary  nonneutralities  and  asymme- 
tries  that  may  arise  because of  capital  market  imperfections.  Behavior  of 
relative  prices,  for example, would  be  identical  in  different exchange  rate 
systems, as  we  know  from  the  work of  Lucas  and  Stockman. But  clearly 
the system of flexible exchange rates is an entirely different system of  col- 
lecting and disseminating  information  and  coordinating  economic  activity. 
As an  example, suppose  that  we  have  two economies  producing  differen- 
tiated  consumer goods with monopolistically competitive market structures. 72  Michael Mussa 
With  a  fixed  exchange rate,  the  structure  of  relative  prices  would  exhibit 
inertia,  and prices  would  be preset on  the basis of  wage costs and conjec- 
tural  demand  schedules.  If,  in  contrast,  we  had  a  flexible  exchange rate 
between  the  two currencies, the exchange rate  would  be  determined  in  a 
speculative auction  market, while domestic currency prices would continue 
to  be  set  in  Hicksian  “fix  price”  markets.  Accordingly,  relative  prices 
would  exhibit  more  variability  under  flexible  than  under  fixed  exchange 
rates, and the properties  of  the two systems in terms of  resource allocation, 
information  utilization,  and risk sharing would be quite different. 
Dornbusch’s  1976 paper illuminates  with  a standard  IS-LM model  how 
differences in the mechanisms of market clearing can explain the overshoot- 
ing of the exchange rate to monetary disturbances. Clearly, there is a great 
deal more to be done in this area. The optimum currency  area literature  is 
basically concerned with the same question from a normative point of  view. 
I  suspect that we have to abandon simple rational expectations concepts as 
we address these questions and recognize  diversity of views, and imperfect 
information which does not permit knowledge of  the model or of the expec- 
tations  of  others.  We must  analyze how  alternative  market  arrangements 
utilize information, transmit  it between  individuals, and in the process help 
them  to form a more coherent view of  their environment. In  saying this  I 
am obviously  indebted  to  my colleague  Roman Frydman. Finally, I would 
also add that  we have more or  less exhausted  the implications  of  the port- 
folio balance model. We need to move on from postulated asset demand and 
supply functions to a more careful consideration  of the structure of financial 
assets, and of  other arrangements that  facilitate  exchange and mediate  be- 
tween  borrowers  and  lenders.  My  contribution  to  the  Hawkins-Levich- 
Wihlborg  volume  is  a  first  step  in  this  direction.  The  work  of  Lucas, 
Helpman, Razin, Svensson, Stockman, and others should also be mentioned 
in  this  context. Toward this  end,  much  more empirical  work  needs  to be 
done on the nature of  financial intermediation  between different countries. 
In summary, work on exchange rates is not finished. We need much less 
advocacy  of  simple-minded  notions  and  much  more  painstaking,  time- 
consuming work.  I expect that such work  will ultimately turn us against the 
current  system of flexible exchange rates in favor of a more orderly mone- 
tary system. 
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